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Abstract	  
 
Climate change will result in variable – but undeniably severe – changes to our 
natural world.  These changes will lead to extreme human and ecosystem consequences if 
climate change is not mitigated effectively, efficiently, and rapidly.  Increasing the use of 
renewable energies around the world is seen as one of the most effective and promising 
mitigation strategies.  Several communities around the United States have recently 
denounced publicly their electrical utilities for their failure to offer the choice to increase 
the percentage of energy that comes from renewable sources.  A growing number are 
taking action to work with – or sometimes against – their energy providers to increase the 
percentage of renewable energies available.  Boulder, Colorado is one of these 
communities.  Since 2005, Boulder has been exploring the possibility of municipalizing 
its investor-owned electric utility, thereby bringing the utility under city control.  In doing 
so, it would control the sources of electricity that would be used by its residents, and 
potentially provide these customers with 100 percent renewable energy.  Boulder is in the 
final phases of studying the possibility of full municipalization and aims to begin this 
process in the near future.  While it remains to be seen if the city will successfully create 
a municipally owned utility (MOU), an examination of Boulder’s thought processes, 
studies, and decision making to date provides an opportunity for a discussion of the 
benefits and possible downsides of municipalization and allows a glimpse into the future 
of MOUs in the United States. 
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Introduction	  	  
 A 2011 study showed that 63 percent of Americans believe developing alternative 
sources of energy (e.g. wind, solar, and hydrogen) is a “more important energy priority” 
compared to “expanding exploration and production of oil, coal, and natural gas.”1  
However, that same year, only 12.5 percent of U.S. energy production came from 
renewable sources.2  This is not due to an inability to produce.  The United States is 
capable of producing a greater percentage of its energy from renewable sources.  Studies 
from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) have shown that the generation 
of renewable energy from currently commercially available technologies is “more than 
adequate” to supply 80 percent of the total U.S. electricity generation by 2050.3  In light 
of the increased demand for renewable energies and their availability, in what ways can 
the supply, distribution, and use of renewable energies be increased? 
This study will focus on a community that has tackled this question in an 
innovative way.  Dissatisfied with the amounts of renewable energies provided by its 
private electric utility, Boulder, Colorado has made moves over the past ten years to take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 "Infographic: Drill, Baby, Drill | Politics on GOOD ", accessed 9/18, 2012, 
http://www.good.is/posts/infographic-drill-baby-drill/. 
2 "Latest Report: Renewable Energy Surpasses Nuclear Power by 18% | Renewable 
Energy News Article ", accessed 9/18, 2012, 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2011/10/another-milestone-
renewable-energy-surpasses-nuclear-power-by-18. 
3 National Renewable Energy Laboratory. (2012). Renewable Electricity Futures Study. 
Hand, M.M.; Baldwin, S.; DeMeo, E.; Reilly, J.M.; Mai, T.; Arent, D.; Porro, G.; 
Meshek, M.; Sandor, D. eds. 4 vols. NREL/TP-6A20-52409. Golden, CO: National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory. http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/re_futures/. 
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control of its investor owned utility (IOU).  Boulder’s process towards municipalization 
reflects a growing interest across the United States for this method of “greening.”  
Boulder is in the final phases of studying the possibility of full municipalization and other 
means to increase for local control, and aims to take steps towards municipalization in the 
near future.  While it remains to be seen if the city will successfully create a municipally 
owned utility (MOU), exploring Boulder’s thought processes, studies, and decision 
making to date provides an opportunity for a discussion of the benefits and possible 
downsides of municipalization and allows a glimpse into the future of MOUs in the 
United States. 
Climate Change 
Increasing the use of renewable energies in communities is of growing interest 
across the nation.  Climate change is an accepted phenomenon and a growing concern.  In 
general, the expansion of renewable energy sources will reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases, thus slowing climate change.  As the National Research Council concluded in a 
2010 study, "[c]limate change is occurring, is very likely caused by human activities, and 
poses significant risks for a broad range of human and natural systems."4  Global average 
temperature increased by more than 1.4ºF over the last century, and the decade from 
2000-2010 was the warmest on record.  The years 2005 and 2010 are now tied as the 
warmest years ever recorded.5  These increases in temperature have corresponded with 
changes in weather and climate around the world.  Some areas have seen a large decrease 
in rainfall that, combined with extreme heat, has led to persistent drought.  Other areas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Committee on America's Climate Choices. 2011. America's Climate Choices (2011). 
Washington, D.C.: National Academies of Sciences. 
5 NOAA: 2010 Tied for Warmest Year on Record. 2011. Asheville, North Carolina: 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
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have experienced increased rainfall that has caused flooding and landslides.  Glaciers are 
melting around the world, especially at the poles, resulting in rising sea levels and 
acidification of the ocean.  Sea levels have risen faster over the last century than ever 
before, threatening coastal communities and island nations around the globe.6 
These changes in the global climate have already caused enormous change to the 
Earth’s ecosystems.  Some species, including butterflies, foxes, and alpine fauna, have 
moved farther north or to higher elevations to escape the heat.7  In Antarctica, the number 
of breeding Adélie penguin pairs has fallen from 32,000 to 11,000 in 30 years.8  Spruce 
bark beetles, a bug that has existed for centuries but that until now has been kept at bay 
by cold winters, have destroyed four million acres of spruce trees in Alaska in the past 20 
years.9  Varieties of pine beetles are spreading across the West and are threatening forests 
in states like Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming.  The dead trees increase the risk and 
severity of forest fire and decrease the forest’s ability to capture carbon.  According to a 
study done for the EPA by Harvard’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, areas 
of Montana and Wyoming could see a 200 percent increase in acres burned by wildfire 
and an 80 percent increase in organic carbon aerosols, chemicals that cause air pollution 
from fires.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups 
I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A. (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 104 pp. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Spracklen, D. V., L. J. Mickley, J. A. Logan, R. C. Hudman, R. Yevich, M. D. 
Flannigan, and A. L. Westerling (2009), Impacts of climate change from 2000 to 2050 on 
	   9	  
 If climate change continues unmitigated, the effects are estimated to be varied and 
severe.  Storms and hurricanes could become more severe and floods and drought more 
common.  Rainfall in already dry Ethiopia could decline by ten percent over the next 50 
years.11  The disappearance of glaciers would mean the disappearance of drinking water 
supplies for thousands of people.12  This melting, combined with the melting of the ice 
caps on the poles, could cause a rise of sea levels of between eight and 31 inches by the 
end of the century.13  A changed climate could also lead to the increased spread of certain 
diseases, such as malaria carried by mosquitos.14  Many species will have to adapt, 
change, or migrate extremely quickly to avoid extinction.15  Some will not survive. 
Climate change will result in variable – but undeniably severe – changes to our 
natural world.  These changes will lead to extreme human and ecosystem consequences if 
climate change is not mitigated effectively, efficiently, and rapidly.  Several studies show 
that changes in behavior by governments and citizens could dramatically slow the spread 
and consequences of climate change.  For this reason, a wide spectrum of mitigation and 
adaptation strategies has been proposed.  These vary from promoting adaption and 
accommodation to entirely banning the use of fossil fuels, and from implementing 
voluntary programs to imposing strict regulations.  The United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) breaks mitigation schemes into eight broad sectors: agriculture, forests, 
energy, manufacturing, transport, tourism, buildings, and waste.  UNEP’s main energy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
wildfire activity and carbonaceous aerosol concentrations in the western United States, J. 
Geophys. Res., 114, D20301, doi:10.1029/2008JD010966. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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strategy is to transition from traditional sources of power to renewable energies or “green 
energies.”  As its website states, 
“[i]n 2010, new investments in renewable energies reached a record high of 
US$ 211 billion, with noticeable growth in emerging economies. While there 
is much progress to be made, decreasing costs and increasing deployment 
experience are making renewables more and more competitive with fossil 
fuels, especially when the latter’s negative externalities, like pollution and 
health impacts, are taken into account. But in order to move towards a greener 
energy path, governments and local institutions will need to increase their 
involvement.”16 
 
The Potential of Renewables 
Increasing the use of renewable energies around the world is seen as one of the 
most effective and promising mitigation strategies.  According to a recent IPCC report, 
close to 80 percent of the world’s energy supply could be provided by renewable energy 
by 2050.17  This increase in renewables could lead to equivalent greenhouse gas savings 
of 220 to 560 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide between 2010 and 2050.18  The report places 
the burden of action on “the right enabling of public policies.”19  As the Co-Chair of the 
Working Group III Ramon Pichs emphasizes, “[t]he report shows that it is not the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 "Energy ", accessed 10/4, 2012. 
http://www.unep.org/climatechange/mitigation/Energy/tabid/104339/Default.aspx. 
17 IPCC, 2011: IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation. Prepared by Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. 
Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. Hansen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow (eds)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 
1075 pp. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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availability of the resource, but the public policies that will either expand or constrain 
renewable energy development over the coming decades.”20 
 Much focus on increasing renewable energy generation is currently placed on 
developing new technologies and on increasing the incentives, sometimes in the form of 
regulations, to encourage the greater use of such energies.  The U.S. Federal government 
has several policies that promote the development of renewable energies.  The majority 
of them focus on providing subsidies to renewable energy researchers and developers.  
These methods have seen some success.  However, there is growing frustration over the 
U.S. government’s perceived inaction to prevent and mitigate climate change.  Critics of 
the U.S. climate policy point to the government’s continuing support for oil drilling and 
fuel subsidy programs, less-than-stringent regulations on fossil fuel use of and emissions, 
and refusal to ratify international climate change agreements, among other things, as a 
sign that the U.S. government is not doing enough to mitigate climate change. 
The Potential of Municipalization 
For this reason, a growing number of states, cities, and communities are creating 
their own programs and regulations to mitigate climate change.  Citizens and their state 
or local government representatives are looking for innovative ways to expand the use of 
renewable energy.  Some success has been achieved through policies that create 
incentives for solar panel placement on private homes and businesses, or that push for 
wind energy installation on private land.  Some communities have relied on public 
education campaigns about energy conservation.  Others have created voluntary opt-in 
programs where homes and businesses pay slightly more in electrical utilities to obtain a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid. 
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larger percent of their electricity from renewable sources.  Others have been successful in 
passing tax measures that pay for renewable energy production for the community as a 
whole. 
However, some communities, like Boulder, are focusing their attention on the 
providers of their energy: electric utility companies.  Many of these communities have 
already tried public education campaigns or opt-in programs and have seen some 
improvement.  However, they are not satisfied with the level of improvement and are 
looking for alternative means to achieve increased renewable energy use.  Electrical 
utilities generally control the energy mix that is used by a community.  As a result, such 
utilities are often the focus of communities seeking a big change in the percentage of 
their energy that comes from renewables.  Several communities have recently publicly 
denounced their energy providers for not offering them the choice to increase the 
percentage of energy that comes from renewable sources.  A growing number are taking 
action to work with – or sometimes against – their energy providers to increase the 
percentage of renewable energies available. 
Much of this attention has recently been focused on the role of investor-owned 
utilities, or private utilities, in supplying and delivering renewable energy.  Electric 
utilities have the power to decide from what sources their electricity is generated.  For 
this reason, municipalization has attracted considerable attention, especially from states 
and communities, like Boulder, that are looking to increase their supply of renewable 
energies. 
For the purpose of this study, municipalization is defined as the process by which 
municipalities (cities, towns, or counties) take control of the distribution and sometimes 
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generation, of electricity, usually from an investor owned utility.  This process results in 
the formation of an MOU. 
Structure of Utilities in the United States 
In the United States, electricity generation and supply is conducted mainly by 
privately owned utilities or publicly owned utilities.  Private utilities are owned by 
investors and stockholders, whereas publicly owned utilities are operated by the city, 
state, or county, or by the customers they serve.  Electricity can also be provided by rural 
electric cooperatives, which are community-owned utilities located in rural areas.  A 
small number of energy customers get their electricity directly from power marketers.  
Power marketers, also known as competitive power suppliers or electric service providers 
(ESPs), sell electricity on the retail market usually to public or private utilities that then 
distribute it to their clients. 
All states except Hawaii have a mix of these electricity schemes, although most 
electricity is provided to customers by private utilities.  Across the nation, 68 percent of 
Americans are served by investor-owned electric utilities, 15 percent by public power 
systems, 13 percent by rural electric cooperatives, and four percent by power marketers.  
The majority of Americans receive their electricity through 202 investor-owned utilities, 
as compared to the nation’s 2,008 public power systems, 877 rural electric cooperatives, 
and 173 power marketers (see Table 1).21  The discrepancy between the number of public 
power systems and investor-owned electric utilities can be attributed to the fact that most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 "Public Power is Hometown Power." American Public Power Association. American 
Public Power Association, accessed 11/17, 2012, 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/51HometownPowerFlyer.pdf. 
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public utilities operate on a smaller scale than do investor-owned private utilities, so more 
are needed to provide energy to a smaller number of customers. 
 
Electric Industry Ownership and Consumers in the United States 
Number and type of provider Proportion of customers served 
2,008 public power systems 15% 
202 investor-owned electric utilities 68% 
877 rural electric cooperatives 13% 
173 power marketers 4% 
Table 1:  Electric industry ownership and consumers in the United States.  Adapted from 
APPA Public Power Fact Sheet 
 Fewer MOUs have been formed recently.  In the past 15 years, 16 MOUs have 
been formed, whereas in the last 25 years, 46 have been formed and 72 have been formed 
in the last 35 years.22 
 There are 59 electrical providers that provide service to Colorado’s 23 million 
customers.  Of these, two are IOUs, 28 are RECs, and 29 are public electric utilities.  The 
IOUs service 60 percent of Colorado’s customers, REA’s 23 percent, and MOUs 23 
percent.23 
 
Electricity Industry Ownership and Consumers in Colorado 
Number and type of provider Proportion of customers served 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Johnson, Rebecca. 2006. Municipal Electric Utilities - Analysis and Case Studies. 
Colorado: Five Star Consultants. 
23 Ibid. 
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2 investor-owned electric utilities 60% 
28 rural electric cooperatives 23% 
29 public power systems 17% 
Table 2: Electric industry ownership and consumers in Colorado.  From, Johnson, 
Rebecca. 2006. Municipal Electric Utilities - Analysis and Case Studies. Colorado: Five 
Star Consultants. 
Of the 59 electrical utilities in Colorado, the largest five sell 75 percent of the total 
megawatt hours used in the state.24  These five utilities are Xcel Energy (an IOU), which 
provides 55 percent of the annual megawatt hours in Colorado; City of Colorado Springs 
Utilities (an MOU), which provides nine percent; Intermural Rural Electric Association 
(a REC), which provides four percent; Aquila (an IOU), which sells four percent; and 
Fort Collins Utilities (an MOU), which sells three percent.25 
Five largest electrical utilities in Colorado 
(measured by annual megawatt hours) 
Utility Type of utility Percent of total megawatt 
hours provided 
Xcel Energy IOU 55% 
City of Colorado Springs Utility MOU 9% 
Intermountain Rural Electric Association REC 4% 
Aquila IOU 4% 
Fort Collins Utility MOU 3% 
Table 3:  Five largest electrical utilities in Colorado as measured by annual megawatt 
hours.  From, Johnson, Rebecca. 2006. Municipal Electric Utilities - Analysis and Case 
Studies. Colorado: Five Star Consultants. 
In Colorado, the average retail rate is highest for RECs and lowest for MOUs.  Colorado 
retail customers of an IOU pay on average 7.54 cents per kilowatt-hour if they receive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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power from an REC, 6.98 cents per kilowatt-hour if they receive power from an IOU, and 
6.31 cents per kilowatt-hour if they receive power from a public electric utility.26 
Whatever entity owns the utility decides what type of power the utility will buy 
and distribute to its customers.  Because investors and stockholders own private utilities, 
IOUs are responsible to these stakeholders to generate a profit.  As such, IOUs are more 
often inclined to buy the energy that produces the largest profit.  In many areas, energy 
produced from coal or gas is cheaper and the distribution mechanisms for these sources 
are already in place.  As a result, supplying an energy mix heavy in electricity produced 
from such non-renewable sources provides the largest profit and so is the energy mix 
most often chosen.  Despite this profit motive, some private energy utilities have been 
responsive to communities calling for a greater amount of renewable energy in their mix. 
 The decision of Boulder to move away from their traditional electric utility in 
favor of more local control has stemmed in large part from the desires to include more 
renewable energy and have more of a voice in deciding the make-up of its electricity 
sources.  Boulder has also traditionally strived to be an environmental leader. 
 As a result, Boulder is currently pushing to municipalize its electric utility.  This 
would mean taking full control of finding, buying, and delivering electricity through the 
creation of a municipal electric utility.  To achieve full municipalization, the City would 
have to buy much of the existing private distribution system, hire new employees to staff 
the utility, and undergo costly litigation with Xcel.  The cost of the distribution system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid. 
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alone is thought to be $120 million, according to City of Boulder estimates.27  Xcel, the 
existing electricity provider, an IOU, argues the true costs will be much higher. 
This paper will investigate the potential of municipalization to be an effective 
method of providing communities with the renewable energy that they demand.  This will 
be accomplished through a case study of the proposed municipalization in Boulder.  This 
case study will include analysis of the: 
• Reasons for the initiation of municipalization 
• Initial support and opposition, including fiscal feasibility 
• Socio-political processes that preceded municipalization 
• Social and political action during the process of municipalization 
• Flexibility for adaption and change 
• Capacity inherent in each scheme for compromise between social, political, and 
business actors 
• Outcomes produced in terms of 
o Percent increase in renewable energy delivered (or predicted to deliver) 
o Community and government satisfaction 
o Influence on other communities 
• Future of municipalization in Boulder and around the United States 
• Alternatives to full municipalization. 
Background and Trends of Utilities in the United States 
There has been a mix of privately owned and publicly owned electrical utilities 
since large-scale electrical generation began in the United States.  The industry itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 "Boulder's Takeover of Xcel Energy Faces Strong Winds ", accessed 9/24, 2012, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2012/04/25/boulders-takeover-of-xcel-
energy-faces-strong-winds/. 
	   18	  
began in the 1880s and evolved from street lighting systems.28  Thomas Edison’s Pearl 
Street electricity generating station in Manhattan was the first true electric utility.  It 
offered reliable central generation, efficient distribution, a successful end use, and a 
competitive price (which the U.S. Energy Information Administration calls the four key 
elements of a modern electric utility system). 
 The end of the 19th century marked a period of rapid growth in the number and 
size of electric utilities.  At that time, public utilities mainly dealt with street lighting and 
trolley services.  At the turn of the century, they produced about eight percent of the 
country’s total electricity.  Privately owned utilities provided the rest and were aggressive 
competitors. 
 The number of municipal electric utilities and their generation capacity dropped 
during the Depression era.  Overwhelmed by the bigger and more efficient private 
utilities, by 1932 the remaining municipal utilities generated only five percent of the 
country’s total.  In contrast, private utilities contributed 94 percent.  The remaining one 
percent was provided by a growing number of state-owned utilities and federal systems.  
Private utilities profited greatly during this era, despite a drop in electricity prices, due to 
a huge increase in demand for power: between 1907 and 1932 the percent of dwellings 
using electricity grew from eight percent to 67 percent.  This electricity use was 
concentrated mostly in urban areas, with 80 percent of urban dwellings receiving 
electricity in 1932 compared with 11 percent of farm dwellings. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The material in this section relies heavily on "The Changing Structure of the Electric 
Power Industry: History of the U.S. Electric Power Industry: An Update - Appendix A - 
Beginnings: 1882-1900 1882-1991 ", accessed 9/19/2012, 
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/electric_kid/append_a.html#N_4_. 
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 Electricity use in farm dwellings grew to 35 percent by 1941 due to increased 
federal attention on the growth of rural electricity services.  The Rural Electrification 
Administration (REA), formed with the passage of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 
focused on providing loans and incentives to utilities with the aim of bringing electricity 
to rural areas and towns with populations under 2,500.  The 1994 Pace Act extended the 
REA indefinitely and, by 1960, rural electrification was nearly complete. 
 Following a period of strong federal development in electric generation (in 1957, 
federal generation reached 17 percent), generation by cooperatives, power districts, and 
state projects again took the front stage.  Between 1950 and 1960, generation from non-
federal public power plants and cooperatives increased from 6.5 percent to 8.5 percent. 
 Between the end of World War II and the 1970s, electric utilities prospered 
enormously.  Electricity demand increased rapidly, consistently, and predictably, while 
prices fell.  According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the electric 
utility industry was characterized by three main themes: robust growth, the introduction 
of commercial nuclear power, and expanding public power that replaced the growth of 
federal power.  Nuclear power was first sold commercially in the 1950s after the passages 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Price-Anderson Act. 
 Continued high electricity growth rates, technological advances, and the advent of 
environmental concerns dominated the history of electricity in the 1960s.  Throughout the 
decade, electricity generation and capacity growth averaged almost 7.5 percent a year, 
spurred on by economic growth, declining prices, and increased demand.  Nuclear power 
grew to comprise one percent of the U.S. total by 1970 and was the principal cause of 
technological advances in automated controls and computers.  Electricity generation 
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became subject to increasing environmental regulation during this era.  In 1969, the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was passed and required that utilities prepare 
environmental impact statements for new power plant construction.  New science about 
the environmental impacts of sulfur dioxide (SO2) led to experimentation with emission 
control equipment in coal-fired power plants, including the construction of higher 
emission stacks meant to better disperse SO2. 
 The 1960s also saw the advent of new challenges in the electricity industry, 
mainly due to the halt in efficiency growth, rising costs, and concerns over reliability.  
Until the mid-1960s, the electricity industry had seen decades of increasing efficiencies 
in generation and transmission.  By the middle of the decade, however, gains in 
efficiencies had declined.  The resulting loss in profits was exacerbated by new 
environmental regulations, which increased operating costs.  Finally, in 1965 the 
Northeast experienced a major power blackout, which brought to the forefront questions 
about the reliability of power networks.  The aftermath of the blackout saw the formation 
of regional reliability councils and the North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC) to promote the reliability and adequacy of bulk power transmission. 
 After the 1960s, the trends of decreasing unit costs and rapid growth reversed and 
the country saw a period of increasing unit costs and slow growth.  These led to price 
increases averaging 11 percent per year.  This reversal was caused in major part by 
inflation that affected borrowing for capital expansion programs, rising fossil fuel and 
natural gas prices, environmental regulation, and conservation legislation.  Inflation and 
rising fuel prices increased the operating and expansion costs of utilities by a significant 
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amount: the price of petroleum increased by an average of over 26 percent per year 
between 1970 and 1980, more than doubling in 1974 alone. 
The 1970s were boon years for environmental and conservation legislation in the 
U.S.  They saw the passage of such landmark legislation as the Clean Water Act (1972) 
and the Endangered Species Act (1973).  Most relevant to the electricity industries were 
the Clean Air Act of 1970 and its amendments in 1977, the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1972, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Energy 
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, the 1978 Powerplant and Industrial 
Fuel Use Act, and the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978.  These Acts 
required utilities to reduce pollutant emissions, limit the use of tall stacks to disperse 
emissions, limit waste discharges into water, regulate the disposal of utility waste, and 
conserve natural gas and petroleum.  All these factors led capacity to exceed demand for 
the first time.  Faced with excess capacity and stagnant revenues, some utilities suffered 
financially and investor confidence decreased.  Nuclear power faced a crippling blow on 
March 28, 1979 when nuclear reactor Number 2 at Three Mile Island experienced a 
partial meltdown.  The Three Mile Island incident, coupled with inflation, increasing 
labor and material costs, and decreasing demand, led to the cancellation of the 
construction of 63 power plants between 1975 and 1980. 
 This trend continued into the 1980s and for the first time total net generation of 
electricity decreased more than two percent in 1982, the first absolute decline since 1945.  
There was little growth in electric demand or capacity during the first years of the decade.  
However, by 1984, electricity generation grew 4.5 percent, reflecting a healthy economy, 
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an increasing preference for electricity, and a decline in electricity’s price relative to 
other types of energy. 
Regulation and Structure 
 Both public and private-owned electric utilities are subject to state and federal 
regulation.  On a state level, Public Utility Commissions, or PUCs, are the main 
regulating bodies.  (State regulation of utilities began in the early 1900s)29.  The scope of 
regulation by PUCs varies from state to state.  Most have under their purview the 
regulation of natural gas, telecommunications, water, railroad, rail transit, and passenger 
transportation companies.  Some, such as Colorado’s PUC, regulate investor-owned 
electric, gas, and water utilities and have partial regulatory control over municipal 
(public) utilities and electric associations.30  Others, such as California, regulate only 
privately owned electric, gas, and water utilities.31  The size of these PUCs also varies by 
state.  Colorado, for example, is allowed 95.6 full time equivalent employees whereas 
California has around 1,000. 
All PUCs have the authority to establish rates, service, reliability, and adequacy 
standards; enforce compliance; oversee entry and exit from the market; and assist and 
educate consumers.  In so doing, a PUC’s main goal is to protect customers and ensure 
that companies serve these customers on a non-discriminatory basis.  In most states, an 
electric utility must apply to the state PUC for a Certificate of Public Convenience and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid. 
30 "About the Public Utilities Commission." Public Utilities Commission. State of 
Colorado, accessed 9/18, 2012, http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/aboutpuc.htm. 
31 "About Us." California Public Utilities Commission. State of California, accessed 9/18, 
2012, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/aboutus/. 
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Necessity (CPCN) before it is allowed to construct facilities to serve the public for profit.  
The Colorado PUC explains the rationale for CPCNs: “[i]ssuing CPCNs increases public 
confidence in the companies authorized to provide electric services in the state. It 
promotes financially healthy companies who will stay in business and provide a high 
level of service to their customers.”32 
Federal regulation of electric utilities developed in great part between 1901 and 
1932.  It was brought about by three main factors: recognition of utilities as natural 
monopolies in interstate commerce; federal ownership of most of the country’s 
hydroelectric resources; and the acceleration of economic programs, including electricity 
development during the period.  Today, both public and privately owned utilities are 
subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  FERC 
works at the interstate level to regulate the wholesale sale and transmission of electricity, 
natural gas, and oil.33  It also oversees mandatory reliability standards for bulk power, 
promotes the development of national energy infrastructure, and authorizes transmission 
line siting and permits.  Its additional responsibilities include the oversight of 
jurisdictional mergers and other corporate transactions to ensure that each is consistent 
with the public interest.34 
FERC also directs the formation of Independent System Operators (ISO) and 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs).  Both ISOs and RTOs exist at the regional 
level.  They are formed to administer regional wholesale electricity markets, operate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 "About the Public Utilities Commission." Public Utilities Commission. State of 
Colorado, accessed 9/18, 2012, http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/aboutpuc.htm. 
33 "FERC: About FERC - what FERC does " accessed 9/18/2012, 
http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp. 
34 Ibid. 
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electricity grid of the region, and provide reliability when planning for the regional bulk 
electricity system.  RSOs hold a greater share of responsibility for the region’s 
transmission network.  ISOs and RSOs exist mostly in the Midwest and Northeast of the 
country and in California. 
 
Map 1:  ISOs and RSOs in the United States.  Copyright of the ISO/RTO Council. 
Some ISOs and RSOs have actively responded to citizen demand for increased 
renewable energy.  Many are now working to identify and solve issues regarding the 
integration of renewable resources into their transmission grids.  For example, 
California’s ISO is working to support the increase in renewable energies mandated by 
California’s Renewables Portfolio Standard for 2020.  It is doing so by increasing and 
improving transmission grids, developing monitoring technologies for existing grids, and 
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planning to receive renewable energy from new locations and at variable times and 
amounts.35 
PURPA 
 The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) is the most significant piece 
of national legislation that affects utilities around the United States.  PURPA was passed 
in 1978 in response to the 1973 energy crisis.  It is part of the National Energy Act 
(NEA), which also includes the Energy Tax Act, the National Conservation Policy Act 
(NECPA), the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, and the Natural Gas Policy Act.  
It was, and still is, “the only existing federal law that require competition in the utility 
industry and the only law that encourages renewables,” according to the Union of 
Concerned Scientists.36 
PURPA forced IOUs to buy power from efficient producers of energy (dubbed 
“qualified facilities”) provided that the cost was less than or equal to the utility’s own 
“avoided cost.”  Avoided cost was defined as the additional cost that the utility would 
incur if it generated power itself, or if it could purchase the energy from a different 
source.37  At the time of passage, Congress fearfully expected that oil would soon rise to 
$100 a barrel.  PURPA was meant to protect the industry, and indeed the country, from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 "California ISO - Renewables and Demand Response Integration," accessed 9/18/2012, 
2012, 
http://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/RenewablesDemandResponseIntegration/default.a
spx. 
36 "Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) “, accessed 10/29, 2012, Union of 
Concerned Scientists.  http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-
solutions/strengthen-policy/public-utility-regulatory.html. 
37 At the time, “avoided cost” was defined as the costs that would be incurred by the 
operation, construction, and fossil fuel costs of thermal power plant. 
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the resulting shock. Its purpose was to “encourage the conservation and efficient use of 
energy resources and to encourage the development of alternative power supplies capable 
of displacing the inefficient use of oil and natural gas by electric utilities.”38  
 PURPA was successful at promoting the development of alternative energy 
sources.  Those with entrepreneurial spirit saw the openings that PURPA created for 
renewable energy companies.  By 1985, 2.5 percent of all electricity produced came from 
PURPA-approved facilities.39  This number jumped to nine percent by 1995.40  PURPA 
also included some creative energy efficiency approaches.  For example, PURPA 
required that utility companies purchase power from industrial companies that produce 
electricity as a by-product of other activities.  For example, if a paper company needed 
steam for its production, it could boil water and send the steam first through a turbine-
generator that would produce electricity.  This electricity would be used in the factory, 
and the waste steam used for the production of paper.41  This cogeneration process 
created much greater efficiency: more than 45 percent of the energy content contained in 
the raw fuel could be used towards productive purposes.42 
One of the most significant effects of PURPA is that it opened the electric power 
industry to internal market competition.  As the Washington Policy Center explains, 
“[o]nce independently generated energy was successfully integrated into the electrical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 "What is PURPA?" EPSA: The Electric Power Supply Association. Electric Power 
Supply Association, accessed 3/1, 2013, http://www.epsa.org/industry/faqs/?fa=purpa. 
39 Hirsh, Richard F. "Powering the Past: A Look Back." Powering a Generation of 
Change. Smithsonian Institution, last modified 9/2002, accessed 10/29, 2012, 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/powering/. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Example adapted from: Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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transmission grid, pressure increased to open access to all transmission lines, so that all 
energy producers could sell their wholesale power to the highest bidder.”43 
 These energy entrepreneurs were called Independent Power Produces (IPP).  
Before PURPA, only utilities were allowed to own and operate electric generating plants.  
Now, IPPs could enter the mix and compete with utilities to sell electric power to utilities 
and end users.  These IPPs included privately held facilities, cooperatives (such as rural 
solar or wind energy producers), and cogeneration plants like the paper factory described 
above.44  Although some of these IPPs failed, those that survived and those that have 
been created since now provide seven percent of U.S. power.45 
 Despite these numerous successes, some argue that PURPA has outlived its 
usefulness.  These critics hold that PURPA should be replaced by a new law that is in 
touch with the times and that encourages renewables as they stand in the current market.  
For example, PURPA only provides that renewable energies be used if their cost is 
competitive with conventional (much more polluting) resources.  Natural gas, though 
generally not considered renewable, passes PURPA standards, worrying those concerned 
with the bad effects (such as air pollution) of natural gas use.46  Furthermore, some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Davis, Elaine R.  “The Problem with Power: Public Threats to Private Utilities " 
Washington Policy Center. Washington Policy Center, last modified 1/1997, accessed 
10/29, 2012, http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/brief/problem-power-public-
threats-private-utilities. 
44 "Independent Power Producer (IPP), Non-Utility Generator (NUG) ", Energy 
Dictionary. EnergyVortex, accessed 10/29, 2012, 
https://energyvortex.com/energydictionary/independent_power_producer_(ipp)__non_uti
lity_generator_(nug).html. 
45 "Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA)", accessed 10/29, 2012. Union of 
Concerned Scientists.  http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-
solutions/strengthen-policy/public-utility-regulatory.html. 
46 Ibid. 
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renewable power generators signed contracts with utilities in the 1980s that guaranteed 
prices of their power for a number of years in the future.  As the contracts expire, many 
of these generators are going out of business.47  However, if PURPA had not been passed 
and utilities continued to construct their own power generators, electric prices would be 
higher now.48 
Despite these drawbacks, PURPA has arguably been “the most effective single 
measure in promoting renewable energy.”  It has created over 12,000 megawatts of non-
hydro renewable generation capacity and opened up the previously vertically integrated 
and monopolistic electrical generation industry to competition. 
Criticism of Municipalization 
 There are four main criticisms of municipalization of electric utilities.  The first 
argues that municipally owned utilities (MOUs) have unfair competitive advantages over 
investor-owned utilities (IOUs).  The second is the worry that a municipalized electrical 
system cannot diversify if things go badly, and so represents too much risk to the citizens 
it serves. Critics of municipalization also point out that the cost of operating, maintaining, 
and administering a utility depends largely on economies of scale.  The large economies 
of scale that allow IOUs to operate are often not available to MOUs that only serve one 
city or county.  Finally, there is the ideological critique that municipalization is inherently 
‘un-American’ – that America is a country where private companies thrive, and where 
government should take a back seat to their operation. 
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Unfair competition 
Critics argue that MOUs have an unfair advantage point to tax exemptions, 
preferential power purchasing provisions, and access to lower interest tax-exempt bonds, 
which MOUs can use to finance capital construction.  A recent study done by the 
(conservative) Washington Institute Foundation found that public power users benefit 
from a subsidy equivalent of 38 percent.  In other words, if there were no tax or monetary 
preferences for public power, the Foundation claims that MOUs in Washington State 
would need to increase revenues, and therefore rates, by 38 percent to operate under the 
same financial conditions as IOUs.  We will examine each of the three main sources of 
unfair financial preferences that go to MOUs – tax exemptions, preferential power 
purchasing provisions, and access to lower interest tax-exempt bonds. 
 MOUs enjoy a variety of tax exemptions unavailable to IOUs.  IOUs must pay a 
federal income tax, for example, that MOUs and electric cooperatives do not.  IOUs must 
also pay business and occupation taxes, property taxes, and other similar taxes such as 
property, gross receipts, and excise taxes.  MOUs do make payments “in lieu” of these 
taxes, but not on the same level.  In fact, if MOUs were made to pay the same taxes as 
IOUs, their expenses would see an 18 percent increase, an increase that would be 
translated into an increase in rates.49  This necessary rate increase, critics say, would 
make MOUs less competitive to IOUs.  As much of the public and governmental support 
of MOUs is based on the alleged lower cost to customers that MOUs offer, this critique, 
if proven true, could pose a large issue for proponents of electric municipalization. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Davis, Elaine R. Paying for Power: The Challenge of Municipalization. Issue brief. 
Seattle: Washington Policy Center, 1997. Print. 
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MOUs are also eligible for preferential purchasing provisions that IOUs are not.  
The federal government owns a number of power facilities.  These federally owned 
facilities often provide power to MOUs at below-market prices.  IOUs do not have this 
same preferential access to low-price federal power. 
Both the initial construction and maintenance of electric utility facilities requires 
access to large, upfront capital.  Both IOUs and MOUs normally must sell bonds to 
finance these capital-heavy projects.  IOUs must sell bonds at market interest rates and 
the bonds are subject to taxation.  Capital construction bonds held by MOUs are tax-
exempt – income tax is not paid by the holders of the bonds. 
This difference gives MOUs an advantage.  According to a study done by the 
Washington Policy Center on policy preferences for MOUs in the state of Washington, 
“[i]f Washington’s government-owned utilities [MOUs] paid market interest rates on 
capital financing, their debt service would be increased by $84,000,000 per year, 
requiring an increase of 3.5% in revenues.”50  While not game-changing, MOUs’ access 
to lower interest tax-exempt bonds gives them a significant advantage over IOUs. 
Critics are quick to point out that, in addition to creating unfair competition, the 
economic benefits enjoyed by MOUs do not truly reduce costs.  They instead shift the 
costs that would be incurred by MOUs to taxpayers at large.  Customers of IOUs, then, 
not only pay for power they consume, but also for the subsidies customers of MOUs 
enjoy.51  This is due in part to the taxation methods for interest rates of bonds mentioned 
earlier.  Instead of issuing corporate bonds, as do IOUs, MOUs are able to issue 
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municipal bonds, or “munis.”  Munis are bonds that are issued by city, county, and state 
governments, “as well as by enterprises with a public purpose, such as certain electric 
utilities, universities, and hospitals.”52  Holders of munis are often exempt from paying 
taxes on the interest generated by the bond.  If they live in the state from which the bond 
was issued, holders are also exempt from paying the state income tax on their interest. 
Because munis are tax exempt, interest rates made on muni bonds are usually 
lower than those made on corporate or other types of bonds.  Because of their tax-exempt 
status, munis are still attractive to investors. MOUs’ ability to issue munis, then, gives 
them an advantage over IOUs, especially when funding capital-intensive projects. 
A switch from an IOU to a MOU would also potentially have a detrimental effect 
on regional and federal governments.  If a city or region switched from an IOU to an 
MOU, the local, state, and federal governments would no longer have access to tax 
revenue generated from the interest from corporate bonds.  This is one rationale behind 
arguments against the municipalization of electric utilities.  The Washington Policy 
Center argues, “the existing financial preferences do not ‘reduce costs,’ they simply shift 
them from certain consumers of electricity to taxpayers at large.”53  The policies that 
allow MOUs tax exemptions, preferential power purchasing provisions, and access to 
tax-exempt bonds hurt IOUs, the customers of IOUs, and eventually taxpayers beyond 
the area served by the MOU.  The residents of the municipality, however, benefit from 
lower energy prices.  This benefit may offset any taxes lost. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 "What You Need to Know about Investing in Municipal Bonds." AAII: The American 
Association of Individual Investors. American Association of Individual Investors, 
accessed 11/17, 2012, http://www.aaii.com/investing/article/what-you-need-to-know-
about-investing-in-municipal-bonds. 
53 Ibid., 2. 
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Diversification 
 Another criticism against the municipalization of electric utilities has to do with 
the difficulties MOUs have diversifying their portfolios and thereby expanding their 
scope, and the risk that comes with that inability.  Because IOUs are normally larger than 
MOUs, they can afford to take on the risk that comes with diversifying.  IOUs can also 
invest in areas beyond a single city or region, whereas MOUs are confined to serving and 
investing in infrastructure in much smaller areas – usually their municipality and the 
surrounding areas only.  MOUs, moreover, often do not have the capital it takes to 
diversify.  They also must often consider local public opposition before considering 
diversification.  These three factors – fiscal constraints, geographic limitations, and 
forced responsiveness to the public – decrease MOUs ability to diversify.  Besides 
increasing risk by “putting all their eggs in one basket,” MOUs challenges to 
diversification deprive them of the possibility of acquiring additional sources of revenue.  
This gives IOUs an advantage over MOUs.54 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 However, a recent study has shown that IOUs are not as successful at diversification as 
one might guess.  A study entitled “Diversification strategy in electric utilities: who 
wins? Who loses?” looked at the diversification strategy and success of ten IOUs and 20 
rural electric cooperatives (RECs) in four upper-Midwestern states.  Defining a 
diversification strategy as “when less than 70% of firm revenue comes from a single line 
of business,” the study found that, although IOUs tended to diversify more than RECs, 
the “performance outcomes of diversification have been disappointing.”  Although 
diversification has the potential to lead to increased market power, economies of scope, 
risk diversification, and increased size and visibility, both IOUs and RECs experienced 
only limited success in achieving these results.  IOUs that invested in ventures related to 
their main business as an electric utility, such as utility construction and other energy 
businesses, faired better.  IOUs with more experience with diversification and/or more 
mature ventures similarly had more stable non-utility performance outcomes.  More non-
energy-related ventures, such as investments in recycling, economic development, real 
estate development, housing, telecommunications, a variety of business services, and a 
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However, failed diversification can be fatal to a utility, and can negatively affect 
the utility’s customers, stockholders, and the community that it serves.  If a utility 
attempts a diversification strategy that is too risky, it can face financial losses and even 
bankruptcy.  These losses would be passed on to the customer through increased rates 
and decreased level of service.  Customers could see a rise in rates or interruptions in 
their energy supply, such as occurred in the California brownouts and 2003 East coast 
and Canada blackouts.  Jobs may be lost, and the entire community affected by the 
temporary loss of electrical power or the more permanent loss of an electrical utility.  The 
availability of consistent electric power is a benefit that many take for granted but is vital 
to community sustainability and growth. 
 The costs of a failed diversification strategy for energy utilities can be widespread 
and hard-felt.  Whether an IOU, a REC, or an MOU, a utility should be aware of the risks 
– as well as the benefits – of pursuing a diversification strategy.  As a study of 
diversification strategies of electric utilities states, “electric utility firms should beware of 
this growth for its own sake, and carefully evaluate competition, requisite skills, and 
profitability when seeking new opportunities.”55 
 The above study did not include MOUs because they are not held by the same 
regulations or pressures from stockholders to diversify. Although their inability to 
diversify is a barrier to expansion, this study indicates that perhaps the inability is a 
blessing in disguise.  If an MOU were unable to diversify, it would not be exposed to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reliance on debt financing led to losses.  One firm studied was forced into bankruptcy 
because of their diversification strategy. 
55 Froelich, Karen A. and John Ramsey McLagan II. 2008. "Diversification Strategy in 
Electric Utilities: Who Wins? Who Loses?" Academy of Strategic Management Jounal 7. 
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adverse risks that come with diversification.  MOUs, not able to be swayed by 
stakeholders to undergo risky diversification, could in this regard be seen as a more stable 
and dependable source of energy than IOUs. 
Scale 
 One characteristic that separates MOUs and IOUs is size.  IOUs often serve a 
much larger area than do MOUs, whose customer base is often confined to a single city, 
county, or rural area.  It is quite expensive to operate, maintain, and administer a utility 
system.  The costs per customer decrease, of course, as the customer base increases.  
Because of these high costs, the success of utilities depends in large part on economies of 
scale.  IOUs are able to rely on these economies of scale to keep their operating costs low 
enough to stay in business.  The economies of scale allow IOUs to save on operations 
costs, maintenance crews, and staff in legal, accounting, and engineering, for example.56  
MOUs, because of their smaller size, are often not able to capitalize on economies of 
scale and so are uncompetitive to IOUs. 
MOUs as Un-American 
 Finally, there is the criticism that the municipalization of electric utilities is 
simply “un-American.”  There has long been debate over the questions of what should be 
under government control and regulation and what should be left up to the private sector.  
The private sector is often seen as being able to “get things done” more efficiently, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Poque, Thomas and Solow, John L. "Review of ‘Considerations in Governmental 
Aquisitions of Utility Systems Properties’." Iowa Utility Association. Iowa Utility 
Association, accessed 4/3, 2013, http://www.iowautility.org/currentissuese.aspx. 
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terms of both time and resources.  As Ronald Reagan, a famous proponent of small 
government and a robust private sector, said:  
Government has laid its hand on health, housing, farming, industry, commerce, 
education, and to an ever-increasing degree interferes with the people's right to 
know. Government tends to grow, government programs take on weight and 
momentum as public servants say, always with the best of intentions. But the truth 
is that outside of its legitimate function, government does nothing as well or 
economically as the private sector of the economy. 
 
This sentiment is still alive today.  If business can be carried out well by the private 
sector, government interference in the U.S. is seldom welcomed unless it is to regulate 
unfair practices committed by the private sector.  The best example of this is the 
regulation of monopolies through the “trust busting” of President Theodore Roosevelt in 
the late 19th century. 
 Although the municipalization of electric utilities can be seen as a response to 
unfair practices of private-sector companies, municipalization is a much bigger endeavor 
than regulation.  IOUs have been regulated since Roosevelt’s presidency with little outcry 
from or even recognition by the general public.  Municipalization represents a more 
substantial form of government involvement in what is largely a private sector industry.  
If done on a larger scale, municipalization could be called nationalization. 
Virtues of IOUs 
Responsiveness to the Public 
 Perhaps the most significant advantage of MOUs is their responsiveness to the 
public.  In contrast to IOUs, which can serve up to 15 million people (as does California’s 
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PG&E), MOUs serve a significantly smaller number of customers.57  This means that 
MOUs have to be responsible to considerably fewer people.  As such, MOUs are much 
more able to take into account the wants and needs of their specific customers – and they 
are expected to do so.  An MOU is directly answerable to its municipality and only to its 
municipality.  IOUs, on the other hand, are responsible to their customers but also to their 
stakeholders.  As stakeholders hold great financial power over IOUs, an IOU is likely to 
be more responsive to these relatively few stakeholders, whose demands may greatly 
differ from those of the IOUs customers. 
An MOU’s ability to respond to the demands of its customers is also made easier 
by the homogeneity of its customer base.  The tastes and demands of a single town, city, 
or community are likely to be more similar than those of an entire state or region.  It is 
therefore both easier for concerned customers to present a united face when making 
demands of an MOU and easier for the MOU to please more of its customers.  This, 
however, is of course not always the case.  There will be plenty of instances – perhaps a 
majority of instances – where demands of an MOU’s customers are divergent.  However, 
because of its size and geographical similarities, homogeneity in demands is more likely 
among MOU customers than IOU customers.  
This virtue is clearly visible in Boulder’s push towards municipalization.  
Boulder’s biggest reason for municipalizing is to decrease the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions that come from its electric supply by increasing the use of renewable energies.  
While Xcel has moved to incorporate wind and solar into its energy mix and has created 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 "Pacific Gas and Electric Company." Pacific Gas and Electric Company. PG&E 
Company, accessed 3/3, 2013, 
http://www.pge.com/en/about/company/profile/index.page?. 
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numerous programs for energy efficiency, Boulder is not satisfied.  Xcel, however, 
argues that they have done their best to appease Boulder by incorporating these 
renewable energies, but also must take into account the demands of its other customers – 
customers who are not demanding renewable energies and who do not want to see their 
rates go up as a result of incorporating these renewables into their energy supply.  By 
municipalizing, Boulder would have full control over its energy mix and could 
incorporate as much as financially and physically feasible, until its customers are 
satisfied. 
Thus, because of their size and relatively homogeneous customer base, MOUs are 
more able to respond quickly and fully to demands from their customers than are IOUs. 
Condemnation 
MOUs also have an advantage over IOUs in their ability, in some states, to 
condemn privately owned facilities and transmission lines.  Some states, such as Alaska, 
have laws that facilitate quick condemnation, whereas others, such as Oklahoma, have 
placed a moratorium on the condemnation of electric plants.58  Colorado allows the use of 
eminent domain to obtain electric utility plants and infrastructure, although there are 
certain restrictions to doing so (the specific laws and processes that go along with 
condemnation will be discussed later).  Despite the restrictions placed on municipalities 
that wish to condemn privately owned utilities, the mere fact that condemnation is 
allowed is an advantage held by MOUs but not by IOUs.  An IOU does not have the 
power to condemn a MOU. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Briggerman, Abby, Radu Costinescu, and Ashley Bond. 2012. Survey of State 
Municipalization Laws. Washington, D.C.: American Public Power Association. 
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On top of being an advantage only available to MOUs, there are ideological 
arguments against MOUs having the power to condemn IOUs.  Many look at the concept 
that governments can take over a facility or facilities built and owned by a private entity 
as overstepping their bounds.  As Shelley Ross Saxer observes, “[a]sk most people what 
they think of a municipality using its eminent domain power to acquire a privately-owned 
utility company and the typical response is one of disbelief and sometimes, mild 
outrage.”59  They do not see the possible benefits that would come with an MOU as 
worth the increased governmental presence, especially at this first step of the process. 
 Closely related to the worries associated with the power of governments to 
condemn IOUs are concerns over conflicts of interest in the regulation of IOUs.  
Especially as the number of MOUs around the nation grows, MOUs and IOUs will 
compete for consumers, prices, and perhaps resources.  Because some governments, 
especially local governments, as shown earlier, would potentially benefit from the 
existence of MOUs in their jurisdictions, there is the chance that they would make 
regulatory or tax decisions that would favor MOUs over IOUs.  This conflict of interest, 
or even the threat of conflict of interest, could potentially be problematic, especially at 
the local and/or regional levels, creating an uneven playing field for IOUs. 
Diversification of Energy Supply 
While it is difficult for MOUs to diversify their capital investments, they are more 
able to diversify their energy mix.  Utilities, both investor-owned and municipal, are 
investing more and more in diversifying their energy sources to include renewable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Saxer, Shelley Ross. 2009. "Government Power Unleashed: Using Eminent Domain to 
Acquire a Public Utility Or Other Ongoing Enterprise." Indiana Law Review 38 (2005): 
55. 
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energies.  This type of diversification can benefit a utility’s customers and community by 
adding a stable and reliable energy supply to the existing energy portfolio and creating 
positive externalities through environmental benefits and job creation. 
Often, as with Boulder, the main push to increase the use of renewable energies 
comes from the public and the local government.  It is difficult for the public to access 
the management of IOUs to communicate its wish for more renewables, and even more 
difficult to convince the utility to do so.  An MOU, in contrast, is directly responsible to 
its public and can more easily be made to incorporate renewables and diversify its energy 
supply.  This diversification represents serious benefits to the environment and increased 
demand for renewables, which in turn leads to demand for green jobs and innovation in 
green technology, and a more varied and thus stable energy supply for the MOU and the 
community it serves. 
Local Employment 
 The creation and operation of an MOU provides opportunities for local 
employment.  MOUs must employ managers, operators, customer service agents, 
repairmen, and a host of other workers to run and manage its daily operations.  As an 
MOU is locally run and operated, it will create demand for skilled local labor.  These 
local workers will demand services and buy goods from the local community, helping the 
economy remain healthy and vibrant. 
Renewable Energies 
 Interestingly, no community other than Boulder has undergone municipalization 
with the express purpose of increasing its renewable energies portfolio in the past 30 
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years.60  If the City decides to municipalize, Boulder will be a trailblazer of the idea to 
municipalize because of dissatisfaction with the amount of renewables offered by the 
incumbent IOU.  According to The New York Times, it is an idea that is already catching 
on around the nation.  In a March 13, 2013 article, The New York Times states, “[a]cross 
the country, cities are showing a renewed interest in taking over the electricity business 
from private utilities, reflecting intensifying concerns about climate change…and a desire 
to pump more renewable energy into the grid.”61 
 If Boulder’s models are correct, MOUs are able to effectively and economically 
incorporate renewable energies into their portfolios.  The City’s most recent study found 
(through quite sophisticated modeling) that Boulder could “with a very high likelihood” 
obtain 54 percent or more of its electricity from renewable resources.  This increase 
would exceed the Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gas emission targets and reduce GHG 
emissions by more than 50 percent in the first year after the MOU is established.62 
 Why can MOUs incorporate renewable energy more easily into their portfolios 
than IOUs?  The first reason is that IOUs are profit-based, and, at least for the near future, 
coal and other high GHG-producing fuels are less expensive sources of electricity than 
renewable sources such as wind, solar, and geothermal.  To be sure, MOUs are also 
responsible to their customers to provide them with electricity at a reasonable price.  
However, across the country, MOUs on average have lower rates than their IOU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bellamare, Bob.  Interviewed by Kathryn Browning.  Personal Interview.  Phone, 27 
February, 2013. 
61 Cardwell, Diane. 2013. "Cities Weight Taking Over from Private Utilities." The New 
York Times, March 13, 2013. 
62 Boulder City Council Study Session:  Boulder's Energy Future Municipalization 
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counterparts.  There are several possible reasons for this observation.  First, MOUs can 
often make use of local sources of power, most notably, hydroelectric power.  The use of 
hydropower by municipalities was a major cause of the success and number of 
municipalization cases in the 1970s.  MOUs also usually serve a smaller customer base 
than IOUs, and so need to employ fewer people, many of whom are city employees who 
can spread their time in other parts of city business.  MOUs often have lower 
management costs because MOUs are usually headed by a volunteer board or low-paid 
city council members.  As we saw in the criticism of MOUs, MOUs are eligible for 
subsidies in the forms of lower taxes and interest free bonds.  These reduced operations 
and infrastructure costs are translated into lower rates for customers.  Lastly, MOUs, 
unlike IOUs, do not have to turn a profit to satisfy investors and stockholders.  They need 
only make enough revenue for the upkeep of the system, customer service, and employee 
salaries. 
  These facts often translate to lower rates for customers of MOUs.  Due to these 
lower rates, MOUs also have more flexibility to incorporate more expensive but greener 
energies into their mix. 
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Map 2: How much more or less IOUs cost than MOUs in price of electricity per kilowatt 
hour.  From, Cardwell, Diane. 2013. "Cities Weight Taking Over from Private Utilities." 
The New York Times, March 13, 2013. 
Municipalization in Boulder 
 Boulder, Colorado is a city of just under 100,000 located 30 miles from the state 
capital of Denver.  Nestled at the foot of the Flatirons near the base of the Rocky 
Mountains, Boulder has long been known as a bastion of environmental thought in the 
western United States.  In May 2002, for example, the Boulder City Council committed 
the city to achieving the goals set out in the Kyoto Protocol of reducing community 
greenhouse gas emissions to seven percent below 1990 levels by 2012.  Although the city 
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came short of achieving the full reductions, the gesture conveys a sense of Boulder’s 
environmental awareness and commitment to action. 
 
Figure 1: Boulder’s greenhouse gas emissions profile.  The red line represents the Kyoto 
Protocol target.  From a presentation by Leslie Glustrom, generously provided to the 
author.  Glustrom, Leslie.  Interviewed by Kathryn Browning.  Personal Interview.  
Phone, 13 February, 2013. 	  
Xcel 
 Boulder has contracted with the Public Service Company of Colorado, an 
operating company of Xcel, for its power and natural gas needs since 1928.  At the end of 
2010, Xcel served 46,867 customers in the city of Boulder.63  Of these, 39,329 were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Eicher, Craig.  Interviewed by Kathryn Browning.  Personal Interview.  Phone, 
February 11, 2013. 
	   44	  
residential customers and 7,445 were commercial.64  The largest remaining customer was 
the City of Boulder.65  Xcel has historically agreed to provide energy and gas to Boulder 
pursuant to the terms of a franchise agreement that is renegotiated every 20 years.  The 
franchise agreement gives Xcel access to the city’s rights of way, allowing them to sell 
and distribute gas and electricity to Boulder’s residents.  Xcel, in return, agrees to 
reinvest three percent of its gross retail sales (equivalent to $3.5-4 million) back into the 
Boulder community.  Xcel made $144 million in gas and electricity sales in Boulder in 
2009.66  The most recent franchise agreement between Xcel and the City of Boulder was 
signed in 1990. 
 Xcel’s relationship with Boulder has seen its ups and downs.  Although it is 
generally agreed that Xcel’s delivery of electricity, reliability, and prices (post 1948) are 
good, there have been conflicts over Xcel’s responsiveness to the desires of the Boulder 
community and Xcel’s use of coal to generate electricity.  Boulder has considered 
municipalizing three times in the past due to these factors.  The first time was in 1948 and 
was caused by anger that Boulder customers were being charged a higher rate than 
Denver customers, though Xcel served both cities.  The second instance came in 1968 
and was over the issue of undergrounding electricity lines.  Boulder citizens were angry 
that Xcel had continually refused their requests to underground these lines (a strategy that 
makes electricity more reliable by preventing damage caused by wind, falling trees, etc.).  
The Boulder government went so far as to place an excise tax on the ballot, but the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Jaffe, Mark. 2010. "Boulder Willing to Let Xcel Franchise Lapse while it Studies 
Future Energy Options." The Denver Post, October 10, 2010.  
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_16294228. 
	   45	  
initiative failed and Boulder signed a new franchise agreement with Xcel.  
Municipalization was again considered in 1990, but no action was taken.67 
 In advance of the 2010 expiration of the latest franchise agreement, Boulder and 
Xcel began negotiations on a new franchise agreement in 2008.  Two full years were 
spent negotiating this franchise agreement – negotiations that were characterized by an 
Xcel employee, Craig Eicher, as “very, very assertive on both sides.”68  A separate side 
agreement was proposed in the spring of 2009 that would shut down the Boulder-based 
Valmont plant (a coal fired plant that began operation in 1924), convert land on an ash 
pile to a 25-acre solar array, increase Boulder’s role in Xcel’s SmartGridCity program, 
and begin a data metering plan. 
 Of these issues, the Valmont plant and the SmartGridCity created the most 
division between Boulder and Xcel.  The Valmont plant had been running its one 
remaining coal-fired generator since 1964 at a capacity of 186 megawatts, yet Boulder 
citizens had been calling for Xcel to shut down the plant for years.  The issue was 
resolved in 2010, when Xcel announced it would shut down the plant by 2017 in a move 
to comply with Colorado’s April 2010 Clean Air-Clean Jobs Act.69 
 The SmartGridCity program was an innovative new program developed by Xcel.  
Implemented in 2008 in Boulder, it used the city as a testing ground.  The purpose of 
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Daily Camera, August 13, 2010. 
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SmartGridCity was to develop, explore, and test smart-grid tools in a real-world setting.70  
The Boulder pilot program was designed to help determine:  
• Customer’s preference of energy-management and conservation tools 
• Which technologies are the most efficient at delivering power 
• The best ways smart-grid technology can be incorporated into operations to 
improve efficiency, reduce carbon emissions, and modernize the energy delivery 
system, and  
• How to implement the most successful of these smart-grid strategies on a wider 
scale.71 
In accordance with the pilot program, Xcel installed approximately 23,000 automated 
smart electric meters in Boulder.72  The SmartGridCity program, however, soon fell into 
trouble.  The cost of the program rose from an estimated $16 million to $44 million.73  
When Xcel tried to recover some of these costs from Boulder customers, it ran into 
trouble with the PUC.  As of now, SmartGridCity meters still operate on many Boulder 
homes, businesses, and university buildings.  The future of the program in Boulder, 
however, is uncertain, especially if the City decides to municipalize.  The program did 
not gain many points for Xcel in the eyes of Boulder citizens.  As Steve Pomerance, a 
prominent Boulder activist, said, “SmartGridCity gave Xcel a black eye rather than 
giving them bartering points [with Boulder in the municipalization decision-making 
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71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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process].  They weren’t interested in working with Boulder, and didn’t know what they 
were doing.”74 
 The relationship between Boulder and Xcel was once again soured by Xcel’s 
decision to build the Comanche 3 plant.  Xcel already operated two coal-fired, steam-
electric generation stations when they began construction on Comanche Unit 3 in 2005.  
Unit 3 is much more efficient that Unit 1 (which came online in April 1971) and Unit 2 
(which went online in December 1975).  According to Xcel’s website, Unit 3 is 
“…Colorado’s first advanced, highly efficient, supercritical coal unit that can generate 
more electricity with less fuel.”75  The construction of Comanche 3 allowed Xcel to retire 
two older and less efficient coal-fired plants and retrofit an additional 950 MW.76  The 
construction cost $1 billion and the retrofit $260 million. 
 Many in Colorado and in Boulder were unhappy with Xcel’s decision to build a 
new coal plant.  They saw it as Xcel committing to coal and making their customers pay 
for the existing system until at least 2070.77  Each Xcel customer pays about $1.55 a 
month to help fund the construction of Comanche 3.78  Moreover, because of the timing 
of the construction of the plant, which took place during the franchise agreement renewal, 
many in Boulder took it as a sign of bad faith from Xcel.  Xcel, they inferred, was not 
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77 Ibid. 
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truly committed to phasing out coal-generated electricity in favor of renewables.  Boulder 
would have to take the situation into its own hands. 
Boulder’s Environmental Goals 
 Boulder began seriously addressing the issues of climate change and greenhouse 
gas emissions in the early 2000s.  In addition to the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol 
goals, the City Council agreed to an “Environmental Goal” that has shaped its 
environmental policies for the past decade.  The goal is: “[t]o enact and enhance city 
policies that cause the Boulder community to become a nationwide environmental leader 
among communities. The City will be a role model of exemplary environmental 
practices.”79  To achieve this goal, the Boulder County Commissioners established a 
Sustainability Task Force and the Boulder City Council assigned the Office of 
Environmental Affairs the task of developing an action plan and roadmap to achieve the 
Kyoto goals.  This plan came to be known as the Climate Action Plan.  This Plan, 
released in 2004, “provides a framework to compare and analyze alternative strategies 
and policies, in order to facilitate Council’s review and the decision-making process” 
surrounding Boulder’s many energy goals.80 
 The Climate Action Plan identifies six foci on which the City will direct its 
attention: use reduction, building standards, renewables, travel, waste, and green growth.  
The City’s goals surrounding renewables are to “promote the use of renewable energy 
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sources for individual buildings and sites” and to “increase renewable sources in our 
regional energy supply.”81 
 Boulder is one of the few cities in the country to have a carbon tax based on 
electricity use.  This tax is up to $21 a year for residences and $94 for businesses.82 
 As of 2004, Boulder received approximately eight percent of its electricity from 
renewable sources.  The City has been recognized by the EPA for its efforts towards 
renewable energy inclusion and is the first community in Colorado to become an EPA-
certified Green Power Community. 
As it now stands, Boulder residents have four options to include renewable energies 
in their mix83: 
• Xcel Energy’s Windsource Program 
• Solar*Rewards program 
• Solar*Rewards Community 
• Renewable Energy Trust 
A brief summary of each of these programs follows.  Windsource allows customers, for 
$2.16 a month in Colorado, to include renewable energies in their energy mix.  The $2.16 
provides the customer with one 100 kilowatt-hour (kWh) “block” of renewable energy.  
Customers can choose to purchase between a single block and 100 percent of their energy 
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(around $20 for the average customer) from Windsource.  Across Xcel’s service area, 
57,000 homes and 1,200 businesses are enrolled in Windsource.84 
 Xcel’s Solar*Rewards Program provides incentives to customers to install grid-
connected photovoltaic (PV) systems in return for the renewable exchange credits 
(RECs) produced by the systems.  Xcel is able to purchase the RECs for up to 20 years 
after installation.  The program was reauthorized by the Colorado PUC in June 2012 and 
has funding to install 30 MW of new installations in 2012 and 2013, respectively.85  So 
far, Xcel has paid over $270 million in incentives to Colorado customers and has 
installed more than 135 MW of solar from more than 12,200 PV systems.86 
 The Solar*Rewards Program is only available to customers and businesses that 
can install a solar system on their roof or in their yards.  To include customers who do not 
have or do not wish to use this option, Xcel began the Solar*Rewards Community 
program.  The Solar*Rewards Community program allows customers to purchase energy 
from a PV solar garden system.  Interestingly, users of the program are legally allowed to 
participate in a system only if it is in their city or county.  There must be an existing solar 
garden, therefore, for Xcel customers to join the Solar*Rewards Community Program.  
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community solar garden.  The developer or municipality receives production incentives 
for the garden and can sell or lease shares of the solar energy produced to subscribing 
customers.87   
 Xcel’s Renewable Energy Trust is a program that Xcel coordinates in conjunction 
with the Denver Foundation that funnels donations from customers to renewable energy 
projects around the state.  The grants – 30 since 2002 – help fund solar projects and PV 
systems for non-profits and communities around Colorado.  Grants vary between $15,000 
and $40,000.  Xcel customers can add a donation to their energy bill or donate through 
the Denver Foundation.88 
 As of 2004, Boulder’s GHG emission profile by sector looked like the following: 
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Figure 2: Breakdown of GHG emissions by sector, City of Boulder.  Adapted from 
Climate Action Plan, City of Boulder, 2004. 	  
The following shows the breakdown of GHG emissions by energy source: 
 
 
Figure 3: Breakdown of GHG emissions by source, City of Boulder.  Adapted from 
Climate Action Plan, City of Boulder, 2004. 
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With the above information, it became clear to Boulder city officials that any attempt to 
decrease the City’s GHG emissions necessarily had to address electricity consumption, 
both at the commercial and residential sides.  In fact, decarbonizing only 30 percent of 
Boulder’s electricity would enable the City to fulfill 78 percent of its Kyoto goal.89  The 
strategies set out in the Climate Action Plan are more than sufficient to reduce the 
remaining 22 percent needed to achieve the Kyoto goal.90 
 As Boulder receives its electricity from Xcel, any attempt to address Boulder’s 
electricity use would have to be done in close coordination with the utility.  However, as 
previously discussed, Boulder’s relationship with Xcel, especially on use of coal versus 
renewable energies, was testy.  Furthermore, Xcel was committed to generating 
electricity from coal until at least 2070, because of the construction of Comanche Unit 3.  
A model of Xcel’s projected fuel mix from 2015-2030 is below: 
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Figure 4: Xcel’s projected fuel mix from 2015-2030.  Data provided by Xcel to the City 
of Boulder, December 2010.  Graph by Tom Asprey, RenewablesYes.org.  Provided by 
Glustrom, Leslie.  Interviewed by Kathryn Browning.  Personal Interview.  Phone, 13 
February, 2013. 
 
Xcel’s fuel mix for generation supply in 2010 was made up of 61.3 percent coal, 27.1 
percent natural gas, 10.4 percent renewables, and 1.2 percent other sources.91 
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Figure 5: Xcel’s fuel mix, 2010.  From, Critique of Boulder's Feasibility Analysis of 
Acquiring the Electric Utility Business within the City. 2011. Albuquerque, New Mexico: 
UtiliPoint International Inc. 
Boulder believed that attempts to decrease GHG emissions from the demand-side 
were not enough to achieve its goals.  It had to work to address the use of coal-generated 
electricity with Xcel.  However, because Xcel was tied to the use of coal for at least the 
next 60 years due to the construction of the Comanche Unit 3, Boulder felt it could not 
achieve its GHG goals if it continued to be supplied by the investor owned utility. 
Boulder Looks at Municipalization 
 These realizations coincided with the expiration of Boulder’s franchise agreement 
with Xcel in 2010.  Boulder city officials saw it as an opportune time to renegotiate the 
agreement to include steps towards realizing Boulder’s new energy goals.  As Jonathan 
Koehn, the Regional Sustainability Coordinator for the City of Boulder, said, the City 
was looking to, “create a new type of partnership” with Xcel – one that would take into 
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account the quickly changing energy market and opportunities and help meet Boulder’s 
environmental aspirations.92 
 Several potential iterations of a new partnership were developed for 
consideration.  Research into these possibilities began in earnest in August of 2005.  One 
option that emerged was municipalization.  Boulder had been considering 
municipalization for the past 60 years, but had never taken formal action to initiate the 
process.93  Rather, the talk of municipalization had been one in several options and 
demands presented to Xcel each time the franchise agreement came up for renewal, but it 
was never actively pursued. 
R.W. Beck Study 
In 2005, however, in advance of the expiration of the franchise agreement in 
2010, Boulder began to consider municipalization in earnest.  Driven by the desire to 
derive more of Boulder’s energy from renewable sources, the city council commissioned 
a preliminary study to research the possibility of municipalization.  The “Preliminary 
Municipalization Feasibility Study” was conducted by R.W. Beck, Inc. and released in 
October 2005.  Its purpose was to “…identify the costs and risks associated with creating 
and operating a municipal utility so the City Council, as well as Boulder’s voters, would 
have information on a full range of service options when they make a decision on 
whether to renew a long-term franchise with Xcel.”94 
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The R.W. Beck study reviewed the existing physical structures that the City 
would take over from Xcel and provided estimates on the costs of severance, stranded 
investment, and purchase price.  It also provided a preliminary cash flow analysis and a 
list of action items for further study.  The study did not find any significant issues that 
would preclude Boulder from moving forward with the possibility of municipalization 
and found that the observable existing distribution system was in good to excellent 
condition.95 
The study estimated that the City would pay $5 million in severance costs.96  This 
is the cost that it would take to segregate the system needed to serve the City from Xcel’s 
existing system that serves the Boulder area. 
The R.W. Beck report also attempted to estimate the stranded costs that Boulder 
would need to pay Xcel.  Stranded costs represent the investments made by an IOU into a 
community that it expected to recover through future rates charged to customers.  For 
example, imagine Xcel had spent $20 million building a new set of power lines in 
Boulder in 2007.  Each year, Xcel expected to receive $1 million from Boulder customers 
that would pay off the money spent on building these power lines.  However, if Boulder 
completes municipalization in 2017, Xcel would have collected only $10 million from 
Boulder customers and would still be out $10 million.  In this example, if Boulder 
municipalized, would it owe Xcel $10 million?  The answer to that question is not 
simple.  It is likely that, if Xcel had expected in 2007 that Boulder would municipalize, 
Xcel would not have built these power lines.  However, Boulder did not ask Xcel to build 
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these lines.  Their worth, moreover, may have decreased over time.  In the end, FERC 
decides the amount of stranded cost due to an incumbent IOU. 
The R.W. Beck study estimated total stranded costs to be $20 million, although it 
noted that stranded costs would ultimately be determined through a standard cost 
proceeding by FERC.97  It is also important to note that the City is considering arguing 
that it should pay no standard costs.  The R.W. Beck study outlined the approach used by 
FERC in its Opinion No. 438 in the case of City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Electric 
Company to calculate stranded costs.  This approach is detailed below: 
 
 
A little more detail about this equation is useful.  RSE is calculated as the annual 
transmission and distribution revenues of the utility subtracted from the utility’s average 
monthly operating revenue.  CMVE is equal to the total retail load multiplied by the price 
of power.  As the study notes, it is “important to realize that the effect of stranded 
investment is primarily a function of the production cost of the utility compared to the 
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‘market’ and the length of time (the ‘L’ value).”98  The City’s estimation of $0 as the 
stranded costs is based on this L value.  It would argue that Xcel had no basis to expect 
that Boulder would decide to renew its franchise agreement in 2010.  Xcel will likely 
strongly contest this argument. 
 The R.W. Beck report also did preliminary analyses of cash flow and purchase 
price.  These figures have been refined and updated in a subsequent 2011 report.   The 
2005 report estimated the purchase price of the electric system at between $82 and $123 
million in 2005 dollars.  This estimation was based off of the original cost less 
depreciation (OCLD) and the reproduction cost new less depreciation (RCNLD).  OCLD 
is the original cost of the property when Xcel originally put it into service, less 
depreciation.  RCNLD is the cost it would take to construct an exact replica of the 
existing facilities at current prices.  OCLD and RCNLD values “tend to set the upper and 
lower limits, respectively, on the range of fair market value for electric system 
property.”99 
 The worth of the system to the City also depends on the retail rates that the new 
municipal utility would charge its customers.  The R.W. Beck study used three models to 
analyze retail rates and their effects on system value.  The base case “assumes that the 
City’s average retail rate will be equal to Xcel’s average retail rate over the study 
period;” the below Xcel case “assumes that the City’s average retail rate will be 5 percent 
less than Xcel’s average retail rate for the first 10 years of the study period;” and the 
above Xcel case “assumes that the City’s average retail rate will be 5 percent greater than 
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Xcel’s average retail rate for the first 10 years of the study period.”100  Using these 
models, the update revised its estimation of the existing system value to between $49.9 
million and $136.5 million.  These numbers now reflect the uncertainty of the retail rate 
levels and the severance and stranded investment costs. 
 The final factor affecting the system worth is power supply costs.  Even small 
changes in the cost of wholesale power can radically shift the value of the system.  The 
R.W. Beck study, for example, found that even a one percent change in markup of power 
supply costs resulted in a 6.3 percent change in the system worth.101  This is a change of 
$6.7 million (calculated as a one percent mark up or down on the base case). 
 The results of the cash flow analysis found that, if the City is successful arguing 
that no stranded costs and only minimal severance costs should be owed, the value of the 
existing system is between the OCLD and RCNLD.  However, if rates were to be set five 
percent above the average Xcel system rate, the system worth would be greater than the 
RCNLD.  Remember that RCNLD is the estimated cost that it would take to rebuild the 
existing system from the ground up in current dollars. 
 Despite the volatilities associated with rates, the R.W. Beck study concluded that 
“there is a reasonable expectation that the City could acquire the Xcel distribution 
facilities within the City for an amount between the estimated book value of the assets 
(approximately $93 million) and their estimated replacement value (approximately $123 
million).  In addition to the uncertainties relating to severance cost, stranded investment, 
and the cash flow analysis, the R.W. Beck study cautioned that Xcel will “vigorously 
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resist” any attempt made by Boulder at municipalization.102  Their budget to do so, 
furthermore, is “effectively unlimited.”103  As such, “[t]he City will have to seriously 
consider whether it wants to engage in a long, costly fight with Xcel to achieve the 
municipal utility.”104 
Limitations of the R.W. Beck study 
 R.W. Beck attempted to get much of the information needed for their preliminary 
study from Xcel.  On March 30, 2005, the City Manager’s office requested data from 
Xcel.  Xcel is required to provide the City with various types of information, such as 
annual electric and gas revenues, components of the rate base that are used to calculate 
returns, lists of property it owns within the City, capital improvement plans, and other 
data.  Xcel replied to the request on July 15, 2005.  However, the R.W. Beck study 
asserted that “much of the information provided was incomplete or already available via 
public sources.”  R.W. Beck used the information provided, but was left with an 
incomplete picture.  As such, they were forced to use alternative means of gathering data, 
such as visual inspection, and estimates.  These data limitations resulted in an incomplete 
and preliminary picture of the process of municipalization in Boulder, and left the 
conclusions open to speculation and disagreement.  Some of the limitations are described 
in greater detail below. 
The R.W. Beck study took into account only the costs that it would take to 
physically separate the distribution system that would serve the City from that which 
Xcel currently uses to serve the Boulder area.  These “physical segregation” costs, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Ibid., 5-1. 
103 Ibid., 5-1. 
104 Ibid., 5-1. 
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separation costs, are independent from the “administrative segregation” costs.  
Administrative segregation entails the sharing of information between the two utilities, 
including information regarding customer usage and sometimes retail billing.  The costs 
associated with administrative segregation are usually less than those for physical 
segregation; however, due to the contentiousness of this process between Boulder and 
Xcel, costs may be higher than normal. 
The study also did not consider the costs of incorporating renewable energies into 
Boulder’s energy supply.  An estimation of the possible added costs of this inclusion 
should be included in any future study, as it is a central goal to many, perhaps most, of 
the proponents of municipalization in Boulder. 
Despite these limitations, however, the research compiled in the R.W. Beck study 
led Boulder city officials to believe, as Mr. Koehn said, that municipalization was the 
“only option to have the control we want.”105 
Robertson-Bryan Study, 2011 
 In summer of 2011, Boulder City Council voted not to renew the franchise 
agreement between Boulder and Xcel.  That fall, Boulder voters approved a Utility 
Occupation Tax by a 68 percent margin allowing Boulder to begin to analyze its 
municipalization option in more detail.  They hired consultant Robertson-Bryan, Inc. and 
commissioned a feasibility report to follow up on the 2005 R.W. Beck report.  The new 
report was released in mid-August, 2011 and, like the 2005 report, was optimistic about 
Boulder’s ability to municipalize and operate a utility.  It found that the “creation of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Koehn, Jonathan.  Interviewed by Kathryn Browning.  Personal Interview.  Boulder, 
January 17, 2013. 
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municipal utility for the City of Boulder…is legally, physically, and financially feasible, 
and that entity would be capable of meeting the City’s core objectives related to rate 
stability, reliability, and decarbonization.”106 
Physical	  feasibility	  
The 2011 study analyzed the distribution system, utility operations, transmission, 
ancillary services, and available energy resources to make its determination of physical 
feasibility.  In doing so, the study assumed that the responsibilities of the MOU would 
include operation and maintenance of the distribution infrastructure, meter reading, 
billing, energy scheduling, risk planning, regulatory compliance and reporting, power 
procurement, and accounting.107  The energy resources potentially available to the City 
could come from Xcel.  Boulder also would also have the opportunity of purchasing 
energy from Independent Power Producers (who often produce renewable energies and 
power from natural gas), wholesale market suppliers (like Xcel), and city-owned 
resources (city solar plants, etc.). 
Achievement	  of	  City’s	  Objectives	  
The Robertson-Bryan study also found that a Boulder MOU could achieve the 
City’s three main goals of rate stability, reduction of carbon emissions, and reliability of 
service. 
 Rates for the first two years of operation will be low because no debt service 
payments will be due until the third year after the MOU was created.  At year three, 
however, the utility could see a 28 percent cost increase (see blue line in the graph 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Robertson-Bryan, Inc. 2011. Boulder Municipal Utility Feasibility Study: Robertson-
Bryan, Inc. 
107 Ibid., 3. 
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below).  This cost increase could be mitigated, however, by setting an initial rate to seven 
percent below Xcel’s rate during the first two years of operation and then limiting the 
annual rate increase to four percent over the following seven years.108  The graph below 
shows this mitigation technique.  It also estimates the rate costs of Xcel and a Boulder 
MOU if a federal carbon tax were to be passed.  If such a tax is created, Boulder’s rates 
would be significantly more competitive than Xcel’s. 
 
Figure 5: Estimation of future electricity rates with and without a carbon tax.  From 
Robertson-Bryan, Inc. 2011. Boulder Municipal Utility Feasibility Study: Robertson-
Bryan, Inc. 
The Robertson-Bryan study only focused on a “base case” scenario in operating 
Boulder’s MOU – that is, it modeled operations as similar to those being delivered 
currently by Xcel.  As such, the study did not study the possibilities of including 
renewable energies in the MOU’s energy supply in depth.  However, it is important to 
note that the MOU would most likely not incorporate a significant amount of renewables 
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into its energy mix right away.  It is most likely that the energy supply would be made up 
of three percent locally owned and generated hydropower and 97 percent low-cost energy 
from the wholesale market (mostly coal and natural gas generated).  As such, the 
Robertson-Bryan study presented this “base case” scenario and developed two basic 
models as examples of how Boulder’s carbon emissions could be decreased as renewable 
energy use was incorporated.  In the graph below, Scenario 1 is the base case; Scenario 2 
models 100 MW of wind energy firmed with natural gas generation; and Scenario 3 
models the gradual development of PV-Solar to 45 MW by 2020. 
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Figure 6: Estimation carbon emissions from municipalization scenarios.  From 
Robertson-Bryan, Inc. 2011. Boulder Municipal Utility Feasibility Study: Robertson-
Bryan, Inc. 
 The study also found that an MOU would have reliable transmission, resources, 
and distribution.  The report found that the transmission grid currently used in Boulder 
would be unaffected and able to transmit the energy Boulder needs.  Robertson-Bryan 
also argued that an MOU would be financially and physically shielded from some degree 
of uncertainty by its diverse energy portfolio.  The development and use of renewable 
energies would make Boulder less reliant on fluctuating fossil fuel costs, and the 
development of local resources would reduce dependence on power coming from outside 
sources.109  Once these developments are put into place, the report argues that reliably of 
service would, in fact, “be greatly enhanced by the creation of a municipal utility.”110 
Financial	  Feasibility	  
The cost of forming a Boulder MOU is made up of three overarching costs: 
transfer of ownership costs ($121 million), start-up costs ($60.5 million), and a cash 
reserve ($41.3 million). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Ibid., 12. 
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Figure 7: Breakdown of costs of municipalization to Boulder.  From Robertson-Bryan, 
Inc. 2011. Boulder Municipal Utility Feasibility Study: Robertson-Bryan, Inc. 
The 2011 Robertson-Bryant report estimated a significantly higher cost of 
forming a Boulder MOU than did the 2005 R.W. Beck study.  A summary of the 2011 
findings is given below: 
 
 
Municipal Utility Start-Up Cost Categories Start-Up costs (in millions) 
Acquisition of the Distribution Assets $121.2 
5-month Reserve for Energy and Transmission* $29.5 
1-Year Reserve for Utility Operations* $11.8 
Distribution System Severance† $15 
Logistics Setup† $32.5 
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Legal and Engineering (excluding Litigation) † $3 
Capital Spares (spare equipment) † $10 
Total $223 
* = Operating cash reserve 
† = Start up costs 
 
Table 4:  Estimated MOU start-up costs.  From Robertson-Bryan, Inc. 2011. Boulder 
Municipal Utility Feasibility Study: Robertson-Bryan, Inc. 
The 2011 study gave $15 million for severance costs compared to the 2005 
study’s estimate of $5 million.  This $15 million is part of the estimated start up-costs, 
which total $60.5 million, or 27 percent of the utility financing.111  These start-up costs 
include $32.5 million for logistics (staffing, purchasing office space, vehicles, tools, etc. 
to operate the MOU); $3 million for legal and engineering services (FERC application, 
OATT wholesale account applications, surveys, utility operations set-up, bonding, 
creation of the utility charter); and the $10 million for spare equipment (equipment 
needed to perform maintenance upgrades and repair). 
Updated purchase price/acquisition cost of Xcel’s distribution assets was 
estimated as $121.2 (compared to the 2005 estimation of $82-$123 million).  The 
Robertson-Bryan study also included an estimate of the cash reserve the MOU would 
need to carry to establish creditworthiness with wholesale market energy suppliers and 
“to be prepared for unforeseen events.”112  These operating cash reserves total $41.3 
million and include a maintenance budge reserve for one year of $11.8 million and a 
wholesale energy transmission cost for five months of $29.5 million. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Ibid., 16. 
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The sale of taxable and non-taxable bonds would finance the estimated $223 
million needed to form a Boulder MOU.  A taxable bond worth $177.5 million would 
finance the acquisition cost, the operating cash reserve, and the severance cost.  A 
nontaxable bond of $45.5 million would finance the start-up logistics costs, the start-up 
legal and engineering costs, and the purchase of spare equipment.113 
UtiliPoint Study 
  
 Xcel responded with its own commissioned report in August 2011, just after the 
Robertson-Bryan study was released.  Xcel hired a consulting firm, UtiliPoint 
International Inc., to “review and critique the City’s most recent analyses for forming a 
utility.”114  The UtiliPoint study reportedly found many flaws in Boulder’s analysis, 
especially in its financial estimates (which was the main focus of the study).  UtiliPoint 
concluded that “…the City will see no financial benefit for trying to achieve 
environmental, rate, and reliability benefits beyond those provided by [Xcel], and may in 
fact have to compromise or take a step backward on these goals in order to avoid even 
greater financial losses.”115 
 The UtiliPoint study identified several factors that they estimated would drive up 
the cost of municipalization in Boulder.  They are as follows: 
• Greater acquisition cost (increase of more than $250 million) 
o Would necessitate an increased debt payment of $24.7 million per year 
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114 Critique of Boulder's Feasibility Analysis of Acquiring the Electric Utility Business 
within the City. 2011. Albuquerque, New Mexico: UtiliPoint International Inc.  3. 
115 Ibid., 5. 
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• Going Concern Compensation116 
• Stranded Costs 
• Separation costs 
• Compensation for investments Xcel has made in Boulder, including 
o $38 million in rebates for the installation of roof-top solar systems 
o $40 million in SmartGrid infrastructure and program costs 
o Energy efficiency investments and energy efficient investments 
• Greater than anticipated operating cost budget. 
If all of these factors were edited into the Boulder estimations, the City would suffer 
considerable financial losses if it chose to municipalize.  According to the UtiliPoint 
study, an acquisition cost increase of $250 million or a ten percent increase in operating 
costs could result in negative cash flows to the City even past 2021.117 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Going concern compensation has to do with how Xcel will be affected in the future by 
the loss of Boulder’s customers, specifically financially.  It also takes into account the 
value of goodwill (e.g. the value of relationships with investors, vendors, and customer) 
and other intangible assets that generate income.  Boulder estimates it will not owe Xcel 
anything in going concern compensation.  Like stranded costs, it is difficult to determine 
how courts will rule on the going concern due to an incumbent utility like Xcel. 
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Figure 8: Comparison of City’s estimate and UtiliPoint’s estimated increases in 
acquisition cost and operating costs.  From, Critique of Boulder's Feasibility Analysis of 
Acquiring the Electric Utility Business within the City. 2011. Albuquerque, New Mexico: 
UtiliPoint International Inc. 	  
The R.W. Beck, Robertson-Bryan, and UtiliPoint studies evidence how hard it is 
to estimate the costs of municipalization and how divergent these costs can be.  These 
facts make a community’s decision of whether or not to pursue municipalization difficult.  
If the best case scenario turns out to be correct, the community may see many benefits 
from local control of its utility.  If the costs turn out to be higher than expected, however, 
a community may see financial losses, debts incur, rates rise, and bond credit worthiness 
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plummet.  These consequences are far reaching and can affect a community long after a 
failed municipalization scheme is ended. 
Colorado Legislation 
 Whatever Boulder does will be constrained by the complex legislation and 
institutions that govern the distribution of energy in Colorado and nationally.  Utilities 
that operate within Colorado must adhere to the rules set forth by FERC (described 
earlier) as well as those set forth by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission.  MOUs, 
however, are not subject to these regulations: “by not owning generation or transmission, 
FERC jurisdiction is not an issue, so the Boulder system will be self-regulated (municipal 
utilities in Colorado are not subject to CPUC regulation).”118 
 Additionally, Colorado is a home rule state.  Colorado’s constitution grants cities, 
municipalities, and counties the option to pass legislation and govern themselves with 
relative independence from the Colorado legislature.  As Article XX, Section 6 states, 
“The people of each city or town of this state…are hereby vested with, and they shall 
always have, power to make, amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, 
which shall be its organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.”119  In 
contrast, in a non-home rule state, a municipality must be granted permission by the state 
legislature to pass any law that is not expressly permitted under existing state legislation. 
Article XX of the Colorado Constitution also explicitly grants municipalities the 
power to provide electric utility services and to develop generation and transmission 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 R.W. Beck, Inc. 2005. Preliminary Municipalization Feasibility Study, edited by 
Colorado City of Boulder. Final Report. 1-3. 
119 Colorado Constitution, art. 20, sec. 6. 
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capabilities (both independently and in conjunction with other municipalities or private 
companies).  It provides that municipalities,  
 
shall have the power, within or without its territorial limits, to construct, 
condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct, 
and operate water works, light plants, power plants, transportation systems, 
heating plants, and any other public utilities or works or ways local in use and 
extent, in whole or in part, and everything required therefore, for the use of 
said city and county and the inhabitants thereof, and any such systems, plants, 
or works or ways, or any contracts in relation or connection with either, that 
may exist and which said city and county may desire to purchase, in whole or 
in part, the same or any part thereof may be purchased by said city and 
county which may enforce such purchase by proceedings at law as in taking 
land for public use by right of eminent domain, and shall have the power to 
issue bonds upon the vote of the taxpaying electors, at any special or general 
election, in any amount necessary to carry out any of said powers or 
purposes, as may by the charter be provided.120 
 
Article V, Section 35 of the Colorado Constitution also pertains to municipal 
electric utilities.  It prohibits the Colorado General Assembly from forming a body with 
regulatory control over municipal facilities and improvements.121  This hands-off 
approach is extended to the Colorado PUC: Article XXV of the Constitution states that 
the Colorado PUC does not have jurisdiction over municipally owned utilities.122  As 
Article XXV states, “nothing herein shall affect the power of municipalities to exercise 
reasonable police and licensing powers, nor their power to grant franchises; and provided, 
further, that nothing herein shall be construed to apply to municipally owned utilities.”123 
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121 Ibid., art. 5, sec. 35. 
122 Ibid., article 25, sec 1. 
123 Boles, Alan. 2013. "Leslie Glustrom is Trying to Save the World--and She may just 
Succeed." The Blue Line, February 8, 2013.  
http://www.boulderblueline.org/2010/05/12/leslie-glustrom-is-trying-to-save-the-world—
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In 2004, Colorado voters also passed the Colorado Renewable Energy Act 
(CREA), which will affect the energy mix of a Boulder MOU.  CREA requires all 
Colorado utilities that serve 40,000 or more customers to purchase three percent of their 
electricity from renewable sources by 2007.  The percentage of renewable energies 
utilities are required to buy increased to six percent by 2011, and will increase again to 
ten percent by 2015.  Of this renewable electricity, at least four percent must come from 
solar.  Its compliance will be the cause of a ten percent decrease in emissions in Boulder. 
Other Municipalization Attempts 
Las Cruces, New Mexico 
 Las Cruces, New Mexico is the classic example of a municipalization effort that 
failed.  Any discussion of municipalization without mention of Las Cruces would be 
remiss.  During the 1970s, Las Cruces was served by El Paso Electric Company (EPE).  
EPE and Las Cruces came into conflict in 1970 when EPE invested in the Palo Verde 
Nuclear Generation Station that was to be built near Phoenix.  EPE’s decision was based 
on two factors.  It projected that oil and natural gas prices – both of which were 
abnormally high at the time – would continue to increase.  The company also worried that 
it had little or no excess electricity generation capacity.  With no extra capacity, the 
company would be unable to add more customers and had no cushion room for times of 
high demand.124 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Daniel, David and Gegax, Douglas.  "A Cautionary Tale on Municipalization," Forum 
for Applied Research and Public Policy 15(2), 2000, pp. 49-53. 
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 Las Cruces, however, disagreed.  The city argued that EPE’s estimation of oil and 
gas prices were too high, as was its estimation of future electricity demand.  The city also 
foresaw the development of energy-conservation technologies that could reduce 
electricity consumption, thus negating EPE’s need for additional electricity generation 
capacity.125 
 The city turned out to be correct in its predictions.126  The Palo Verde Nuclear 
Generation Station came online in 1988.  The plant was immensely expensive to 
construct and, once completed, did not see the expected demand.  EPE was unable to 
cover its investment in the plant, and had to increase its rates to recover the financial 
losses.  Las Cruces’s electricity rates soared.127 
 Las Cruces was fed up with EPE.  The franchise agreement between the City and 
EPE was to expire in 1993.128  Las Cruces saw this as an opportunity to escape from the 
over charging and uncooperativeness it perceived from EPE.  The city council passed an 
ordinance in 1991, in advance of the expiration of the franchise agreement, to establish a 
municipal electric utility.  Like Boulder, the City planned to purchase the local 
distribution system from EPE and buy its power wholesale. 
 The City estimated that by switching to an MOU, Las Cruces customers would 
save 29 percent over 14 years.129  This projection was based on a number of assumptions.  
First, the City believed that it could buy the distribution system from EPE for $20-30 
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million.130  This number was equal to EPE’s original cost less depreciation (OCLD).  
Second, Las Cruces estimated that the price of establishing the MOU would be almost 
entirely limited to the cost of EPE’s distribution system.  Finally, the City assumed that 
EPE’s rates after municipalization would stay relatively flat.131 
 By 1997, it was clear that the City had been wrong in all three of its predictions.  
EPE, trying to keep its right to serve Las Cruces, initially refused to sell its distribution 
system to the city.  The City decided to undergo condemnation proceedings in 1994.  The 
decision initiated a series of legal battles that lasted years and consumed millions of 
dollars.132  The state legislature eventually intervened and the issue was sent to the New 
Mexico Supreme Court, which approved the condemnation in 1998.133  More legal fees 
were incurred when EPE took the City to the state district court over the subject of bonds.  
In 1992, Las Cruces decided to sell $72.5 million in bonds out of the $90 million allowed 
by the state to fund municipalization.134  EPE charged in the case that Las Cruces needed 
approval by the New Mexico Public Utility Commission to sell these bonds.  The case 
was dismissed, but the City incurred yet more money in legal fees. 
 The cost of just compensation added to the expense.  The City estimated that they 
would owe EPE $37.9 million in just compensation.  Other estimates, however, were as 
high as $200 million.  The discrepancy between these prices was based, besides on 
uncertainty, on differing systems of valuation used to determine the cost of EPEs system. 
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 Las Cruces had not predicted that it would have to pay EPE any stranded costs.  
In Order 888, its first stranded cost decision, FERC ruled in 1998 that the city pay EPE 
$53 million.  This increased the total cost, including legal fees, from an estimated $30 
million in 1994 to $100 million.135 
 Two events, combined with these new realizations about the cost, made Las 
Cruces stop the process towards municipalization.  In 1999, New Mexico passed the 
Electric Utility Industry Restructuring Act.  The Act, in effect, deregulated the electric 
industry.  In doing so, it made it less likely that electricity provided through an MOU 
would be less expensive than that provided through EPE.136  Around this time, EPE also 
reduced its rate to eight percent below the levels the city had predicted at the beginning of 
their study of municipalization.137  With these realizations of cost, deregulation, and 
EPE’s new rates, Las Cruces folded and signed a franchise agreement with EPE. 
 By the time the city signed the franchise agreement, it had already spent between 
$21 million and $40 million, including the money spent to annul the $75 million in bonds 
that Las Cruces had already sold to fund municipalization.138  EPE ended up paying the 
city $21 million and granted the city the right to buy the distribution when the new 
franchise ended for 30 percent more than the book value of the system.139  The graph 
below gives an illustration of the large differences between the estimated costs and the 
actual costs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Ibid. 
136 Snider, Laura.  "Former Las Cruces Mayor to Boulder: Municipalization Has Perils." 
The Daily Camera, April 30. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
	   78	  
 
 
Figure 9: Las Cruces costs over time, estimations and real costs.  From, Critique of 
Boulder's Feasibility Analysis of Acquiring the Electric Utility Business within the City. 
2011. Albuquerque, New Mexico: UtiliPoint International Inc. 
 All in all, Las Cruces’s attempt to municipalize was disastrous.  The City spent 
millions of dollars and countless employee hours on a process that was never completed.  
The episode made many in the industry and in local and state governments wary of 
municipalization.  Based on the experience of Las Cruces, it seemed as though 
“municipals may have lost their edge.”140 
Massena, New York 
 Massena, New York municipalized its electric utility in 1981.  In contrast to Las 
Cruces, Massena is considered one of the most successful examples of municipalization.  	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At the time, Massena was the home to approximately 20,000 residents and was served by 
Niagara Mohawk.  Niagara Mohawk was beleaguered by a heavy tax structure that 
resulted in high rates for its customers.141  On May 30, 1974, voters approved the creation 
of the Massena Electric Department (MED).  After a hostile takeover of the incumbent 
utility’s distribution system, MED began operations on May 8, 1981.  After 
municipalization was complete, Messina rates were 24 percent lower than those it had 
paid under Niagara Mohawk.142  Its rates are now in the lowest ten percent nationally.143  
MED currently serves 9,000 customers over 131 square miles and has one of the highest 
leading indicators of service reliability and environmental commitment.144 
 What made Massena’s municipalization efforts so successful?  One of the biggest 
reasons is Massena’s access to inexpensive hydropower resources.  Massena is home to 
the Niagara Power Project.  Almost all of the 75 percent of Messena’s energy that comes 
from renewable energies is hydropower generated through the Niagara Power Project.  In 
fact, this power is equal to more than three times the amount of renewable energy 
purchased by all of the IOUs in New York State.145 
The other factor that made Massena’s municipalization so successful was its 
access to tax-exempt bonds, which it could use to finance the acquisition of Niagara 
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Mohawk.146  The ability of Massena to use these tax-exempt bonds decreased the 
acquisition costs, especially over time.  These two factors are the main reasons for 
Messina’s remarkable and continuing success.  Messina has served as a role model for 
many communities interested in municipalizing their electric utilities. 
Reverse Municipalization – Vero Beach, Florida 
 
 Once a community chooses to create a municipal utility, that MOU will not 
necessarily serve the municipality forever.  Some communities choose to sell their MOU 
to an IOU in a process termed “reverse-municipalization.”  Communities choose to 
reverse municipalize for a number of reason, the most common of which seem to be rate 
and reliability concerns. 
 Vero Beach, Florida is an example of a community that decided to sell its MOU 
to an IOU.  Vero Beach formed its MOU more than 50 years ago.  However, the residents 
of Vero Beach voted to approve an agreement to sell the city’s electric utility to Florida 
Power & Light Co. (FPL) in March of 2013.  The vote was 64 percent in favor of selling 
the MOU and 36 percent against (a total of 3,663 ballots were cast).147  The MOU, which 
serves 34,000 (primarily residential) customers, would be sold to FPL for $179 
million.148  Though voters have approved the sale, the Florida Public Service 
Commission, the Florida Municipal Power Agency, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 McNamara, Will. "Scientech Issue Alert: Hermiston, Ore., Will Municipalize Electric 
System this October." ElectricNet. VertMarkets, Inc., last modified July 25, 2001, 
accessed 4/1, 2013, http://www.electricnet.com/doc/Scientech-Issue-Alert-Hermiston-
Ore-Will-Muni-0001. 
147 Salisbury, Susan. 2013. "Vero Beach Voters Approve Utility Sale to Florida Power & 
Light Co." The Palm Beach Post, March 13, 2013. 
148 Ibid. 
	   81	  
Commission, and the IRS must also approve the deal.  Officials hope the sale will be 
finalized by the first quarter of 2014.149 
 Vero Beach’s decision to pursue reverse municipalization was based on rates.  
Vero Beach’s MOU charged a customer using 1,000 kilowatt hours a month $137.89.  
FLP charges the same customer $99.91 and as a company would pay a six percent 
franchise fee to Vero Beach.150  This discrepancy in cost is due partly to FPL’s use of 
natural gas as its primary fuel (made possible because of its economies of sale).  Vero 
Beach, in contrast, is 60 percent dependent on coal.151 
 Opponents of municipalization like to point to communities that choose to reverse 
municipalize as proof that municipalization is a flawed practice.  Although for some 
communities, reverse municipalization may make sense and be welcomed, it does not 
spell the demise or inherent failure of municipalization.  
Lessons	  and	  Conclusions	  
In our study of the municipalization of electric utilities, one thing has become 
abundantly clear: municipalization is a long and complicated process characterized by 
high uncertainty.  It is unheard of for MOUs to be formed in less than a year, and even a 
length of a year or two is rare.  Hard-fought municipalization battles between 
communities and investor-owned utilities often take between seven and eight years, and 
have lasted up to ten years.  Once the legal terms are agreed upon, it usually takes 
between one and two years for the new municipal utility to begin operations. 	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If a community decides to municipalize, it still faces great uncertainties.  As Bob 
Bellamare, a long-time industry leader notes, “buying [an electrical utility’s distribution 
system] is very costly, even if it’s voluntarily sold.”152  The hope of many communities 
looking to municipalize – that they will be able to purchase the incumbent utility for book 
value – is “wishful thinking,” according to Bellamare.153  As seen in the case of Las 
Cruces, the legal process can add large costs in terms of the court’s ruling and also from 
legal fees.  As there have been relatively few cases of municipalization, especially in the 
past decade, it is difficult to predict how a court will rule on the amount of stranded costs 
owed to the incumbent utility. 
If a community is successful at municipalizing, there is still the risk that the newly 
formed MOUs’ rates will be higher than those of the incumbent IOU, its reliability worse, 
or its customer service unsatisfactory.  Although the presence of these factors does not 
necessarily mean the failure of the MOU, it has been reason for several MOUs to reverse 
municipalize.  This is less likely to occur if there was another reason to municipalize than 
lower rates, unreliability of the IOU, or bad relations between the community and the 
IOU. 
How can communities considering municipalization cope with these 
uncertainties?  First, the community can attempt to obtain all the information possible 
about costs, logistics, and energy sources.  This is a daunting task.  As Boulder has seen, 
there is an enormous amount of data about demand, supply, costs, mapping, and other 
key factors.  Wading through this data takes time, effort, and a necessary level of 	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expertise on energy issues.  Furthermore, if Xcel is any example, the incumbent utility 
may be unwilling to provide information to the community, even if they are required to 
do so by law.  Communities can rely on the knowledge of outside counsels, although this 
can be quite expensive.  Alternatively, they can hire additional staff (also costly) or rely 
on the know-how of community members, as Boulder has done.  As more communities 
municipalize, they will provide support and expertise to places beginning the process. 
FERC could help mitigate some of the financial uncertainties of municipalization.  
One of the largest possible costs of municipalization is the stranded cost that a 
community will owe to the incumbent utility.  As of now, this stranded cost is one of the 
biggest uncertainties for a community looking to municipalize.  As discussed earlier, the 
stranded cost estimates for Boulder range from $0 to $255 million.  These are make-or-
break costs for a community considering municipalization.  FERC should provide more 
detailed guidelines on how stranded costs are determined in its legal proceedings. 
No matter how detailed and comprehensive a community’s data collection and 
modeling, unpredicted circumstances can arise that make municipalization more or less 
viable.  As such, communities should incorporate off-ramps into their planning processes.  
These off-ramps can take many forms.  They can be a vote, either by the community or 
by the city council; a decision to stop the process based on the outcomes of a key study or 
court decision; or a set of metrics that, if not fulfilled, dictates the end of the process. 
Closely tied to all of these factors is the necessity of mature leaders in the local 
government that are willing and able to examine municipalization objectively.  As 
Boulder comes closer to a City Council vote on whether or not to begin action on 
municipalization, this is a criticism that is being articulated by skeptics – Boulder city 
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leaders, they say, are already too invested in municipalization.  They will choose to see 
the process to fruition because of interest in its outcome, even if municipalization may 
not be the best thing for Boulder. 
There are several key factors that most often lead to the success or failure of 
municipalization.  Municipalization will more likely be successful if,  
• The local government is well-perceived by the citizens 
• Funding is available for the campaign effort 
• The incumbent utility is in financial trouble 
• The incumbent utility is unpopular in the community 
• State and local laws provide for municipalization 
• The community does substantial research on municipalization before undergoing 
the process 
• The courts find a low stranded cost is due 
• There is a well-articulated reason for municipalizing. 
It is rare that all of these factors are true for a given community.  However, if a majority 
of these factors are present, or even if a few of these factors are very strong, 
municipalization can still be successful.  In the case of Boulder, six of these factors are 
currently favorable: the local government is on the whole well-perceived by Boulder 
residents, funding was available for the campaign effort (though Boulder did not 
outspend Xcel by any means, enough was spent that the referendums passed), the 
incumbent utility is unpopular in the community (at least to some extent), the community 
has done substantial research on municipalization, and there is a well-articulated reason 
	   85	  
for municipalizing.  It remains to be seen if the courts will find that a low stranded cost is 
due.   
 Several other factors have made Boulder’s push for municipalization successful 
so far.  First of all, Boulder is home to an exceptionally educated and informed citizenry.  
Boulder houses 16 federally funded research centers, including the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research (NCAR), the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  NCAR alone employs 
more than 120 Ph.D. researchers on staff and hosts hundreds of visiting scientists.  The 
University of Colorado, Boulder boasts 30,000 students and 8,000 staff.  These factors 
combined have led to the fact that Boulder has the highest percentage of college 
graduates in the country.154 
 These highly educated citizens are very involved in local governance.  Many 
heated arguments heard around the city are about city parks or local water quality issues.  
The citizens of Boulder have been just as involved in the process of studying 
municipalization.  The latest study exploring municipalization was made possible in large 
part by a volunteer group of 50 individuals who put large amounts of time, effort, and 
expertise into studying and modeling various processes and iterations of 
municipalization. 
 These involved citizens provide numerous advantages to Boulder in its pursuit of 
municipalization.  They provide expertise that may be lacking in city employees.  They 
provide additional manpower and time on a volunteer basis.  For local governments often 
facing tight budgets and overworked employees, an educated volunteer base is a huge 	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advantage.  Lastly, these volunteers were able to fill in gaps in modeling knowledge that 
was not provided by Xcel but that was necessary for accurate estimations of energy use 
and cost.  The models created by these volunteers were important in the 2011 Boulder 
Election and will be central to the City Council’s yes or no vote on municipalization in 
April of 2013. 
 Lastly, there is a general consensus around the goals that are driving 
municipalization in Boulder.  It has been clear from the start that a major reason for 
municipalization in Boulder is to increase the availability and use of renewable energies 
in the City’s power supply.  This is a goal that dovetails with the beliefs and desires of 
many Boulder citizens.  Boulder has consistently been named one of the greenest (if not 
the most green) cities in the country.  This distinction is due as much to the general pro-
environmentalism of Boulder residents as to the City’s efforts and regulations towards 
sustainability.  In a recent interview, one of the most active proponents for 
municipalization in Boulder, Leslie Glustrom, responded to the question of why she has 
volunteered so much of her time towards the cause.  She replied that she thought it was 
the best and fastest way to make a real difference in combating climate change in 
Boulder, a goal that was of primary importance to her.155  The goal of increasing 
availability of renewable energies through municipalization has brought the Boulder 
community together and inspired it to action.  It remains to be seen whether this mutual 
civic inspiration will survive what promises to be a lengthy, complex, costly, and 
contentious journey.  What is certain is that municipal customers and utilities across the 
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country will be watching closely as Boulder makes its way along the path towards 
municipalization. 
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